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ABSTRACT 
The Donlin and Pebbles mines are two of the eight industrial-scale hard rock mines 
currently under the review of Alaska’s Large Mine Permitting program. Both projects 
promise to deliver profit and employment to their respective regions: Pebble to Bristol 
Bay in the southwest, and Donlin to the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta, just north of Pebble. 
Both projects would also produce exceptional quantities of waste and will require almost-
unprecedented infrastructure development, potentially threatening the lives and 
subsistence livelihoods of the Alaska Native peoples in their respective regions. The 
Pebble project inspired international protest and led to the emergence of a powerful 
resistance coalition of commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishers; activists and 
expert-consultants were thus able to build a powerful movement outside of and prior to 
the state permitting and impact assessment process. The coalitions that arose to oppose 
the Donlin project, in contrast, channeled their work through the state’s official public 
engagement processes – in part, due to strategic limitations stemming from the 
complexities of land use, sovereignty, and development politics specific to the Yukon-
Kuskokwim region.  
 
The coalitional resistance to Pebble and the creative use of Donlin’s public participation 
process are key sites in which Western science and knowledge systems, as well as land 
use ideologies centered on extraction and profit, meet with Native Alaskan traditional 
knowledge and subsistence approaches to land use. I draw upon a history of Alaskan land 
use policy alongside extensive interviews with community organizers, state and federal 
officials, mining industry officials, and consultants in order to describe and understand 
the result: a set of creative resistance strategies that forefront hybrid approaches to 
knowledge and multiple, overlapping understandings of the land. Unfortunately, Alaska’s 
large mine permitting and environmental assessment processes are often structurally and 
epistemologically unable to consider these divergent discourses and the public 
imaginations of alternative futures they support and constitute. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On a midsummer day in 1880, on an empty beach just east of the Sitka Island 
settlement, American prospector Richard Harris and his French-Canadian colleague Joe 
Juneau failed to locate Alaska’s first major gold deposit after bartering their grubstake for 
a large quantity of alcohol. Their bender came to an end only when their untied canoe 
drifted to sea on a midnight high tide, and the two resorted to trading their guns for 
passage back to Sitka (Marshall, 2012). The prospectors’ disgraced return did not go 
unnoticed by their employer, cantankerous Sitka entrepreneur George Pilz, who despite 
their failure and the stock of ready prospectors on his payroll dispatched the pair again 
with new canoes, renewed rations, and a stern warning (Hawley and Stone, 1999). 
Prospectors in the late 1800s were increasingly turning their attention northward as 
California gold claims ran dry, and Pilz was not one to be left behind.  
Stories diverge on the events that followed. Pilz’s later reports, penned in 1922 
four years before his death, may be the most direct account – though by the 1920s the 
popular myths of the Juneau deposit had had forty years to solidify.1 Pilz remembered 
chartering Captain John M. Vanderbilt of the Northwest Trading Company to transport 
Juneau and Harris to what would later be known as Gold Creek, where they loaded a 
payload of gold-rich ore samples into the bottom of a canoe that Pilz had supplied. But 
instead of returning to Sitka, as Pilz had instructed, the prospectors set out to Victoria, 
Canada, planning to sell their boat, provisions, and ore for a substantial profit.  
																																																								
1 A wealthy man in 1880, Pilz would later fall into substantial financial and legal trouble. After the loss of 
his land and a stint in a California jail – released on a bail payment made in gold dust by none other than 
Richard Harris – Pilz entered into a period of deep bitterness that is expressed in his reflections. 
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They didn’t get far. Another of Pilz’s hired prospectors apprehended them en 
route and delivered the pair to their employer at gunpoint.2 Pilz would later return to 
verify the Juneau/Harris deposit and register his claims, and other gold-hungry 
prospectors soon followed. By 1883 the Juneau/Harris site was a regular feature in the 
national press; an August report in the San Francisco Chronicle described the bustling 
site at Gold Creek as follows: 
In Specimen Gulch in Silver Bow Basin, Juneau and Harris first discovered gold 
in 1881. They are still working the claim, which pays about $20 per day per man 
engaged in working…Surrounded by snow-capped mountains towering far above 
it, and intersected by the rushing, foaming Gold Creek, with its many cascades 
and falls, it is exceedingly picturesque. About a dozen houses and as many tents 
have been put up here, and one hundred white men and fifty Indians are at work 
in the mines. At present the mining is mainly Placer and hydraulic…There have 
been about a hundred claims located in the Basin, and twenty-five are being 
worked. A large number only await capital to develop them. 
A town soon sprang up along the coast (“a collection of about one hundred houses, 
arranged ‘in most admired disorder,’ at the foot of an almost perpendicular bluff,” 
remarked the same Chronicle report), renamed Juneau from its original Harrisburgh when 
Joe stacked the local ballot box. The 1890 census reported Juneau as Alaska’s largest city 
																																																								
2 Not everyone agreed with Pilz’s recollections. Other reports place Harris and Juneau’s failed 
abscondment as a dramatic finish to their first attempt up Gold Creek – leaving out the second journey 
altogether – while Harris’ grandson, in a minority opinion, holds that his ancestor was honest and sober to 
the end. But while Harris later came to be known for his generosity and, paradoxically, his sobriety, there 
are few who deny the colorful stories of Juneau and Harris’ early expeditions. Rather, the pair’s “reluctance” 
in their business relations with George Pilz appears to be a matter of general pop-historical agreement. See 
“Rapscallion?” (1998). 
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at 1,253 residents, with an additional 402 people at the new Treadwell mine site just 
across Gastineau Channel (Sandberg, 2013). Politics followed population and the dollar 
in turn, and in 1906 local governance was transferred from Sitka to Juneau. Twenty-five 
years after the end of the California rush, and nearly as long before discovery of gold in 
the Klondike, Alaska was experiencing a gold rush of its own. It represented a vertical 
shift in imaginations of land use and value: Where beaver were found on the land’s 
surface, gold – even the gold gathered from rivers or sifted from the silt at the bottom of a 
stream – was understood to be a subsurface resource. Suddenly, Alaskan land was 
valuable not only for what lived and grew on its surface, but also for what lay hidden 
beneath it.  
Alaska’s gold prosperity certainly cannot be traced to the resourcefulness of either 
Juneau or Harris, but it cannot be attributed to Pilz’s dogged entrepreneurship, either. The 
Juneau deposit, isolated as it was from then-capital Sitka, came to the knowledge of Pilz 
and other American businessmen not through the work of intrepid white explorers but as 
the result of a gold-bounty claimed by Auk Chief Kowee. It was Kowee, moreover, who 
guided the reluctant Juneau and Harris on their second expedition after the orchestrated 
failure of their first attempt. Kowee would later gain recognition not as a prospector or 
discoverer in his own right, but as a symbol of benign settlement and cooperation 
between settlers and Alaskan Native populations, a Northern counterpart to New 
England’s Squanto. In 1999, Kowee joined Harris, Juneau, and mine executive 
Livingston Wernecke as the newest inductees into the Alaska Mining Hall of Fame. 
Alaskan history has long centered on the promises and prospects of profitable 
resource development, from the 19th century Russian fur-traders who brought with them 
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guns, alcohol, and Orthodox priests to contemporary economies built around oil and 
metals. Since the first gold development near Juneau, it is subsurface resource 
development in particular that has served as a key impetus for conflicts over land use, 
resource management, environmental protection, and Native sovereignty. To speak of 
land, politics, environment, and development in contemporary Alaska, therefore, is to 
open a black box of institutional, legal, social, and historical complexity, whether one 
begins the story in 1999, 1880, or earlier still. 
One hundred years after Juneau and Harris’ expedition, and fifty years after 
Alaska had gained full statehood, the Cominco mining company would discover the first 
gold/copper tract at the Pebble site near Bristol Bay. Initial exploration of the Pebble 
region in the 1990s had revealed the location of the large copper, gold, and molybdenum 
deposit north of Lake Iliamna. Later termed “Pebble West” after the discovery of a 
deeper deposit to the east, the Pebble site promised to become the world’s second largest 
of its kind by dollar value – and the largest open pit mine in the country. Mining had 
stagnated mid-century as most of Alaska’s easily accessible minerals were stripped from 
riverbeds and ore-rich rock, and the Pebble claim was the largest of a new crop of low-
density, low-grade, industrial-scale projects that had gained viability with the 
introduction of new mining techniques in the late 20th century. The Pebble mine proved 
especially controversial, however, due to its particular location on a tract of state-owned 
land along the North and South forks of the Koktuli River and the Upper Talarik Creek – 
part of the network of rivers and streams that form the primary spawning ground for the 
millions of salmon that return each year to Bristol Bay’s Kvichak and Nushagak Rivers. 
These, combined with the Wood River system, represent a quarter of the world’s 
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commercial sockeye salmon production. Other rivers that feed into Bristol Bay account 
for an additional twenty-six percent, bringing Bristol Bay’s sockeye production to half of 
the total global yield (Nature Conservancy, 2011). Bristol Bay salmon also support a 
thriving subsistence culture throughout the traditional territory of Bristol Bay’s Yup’ik, 
Dena’ina, and Alutiq communities – one that long predates commercial industry. 
Simultaneously, the late 1990s also saw initial exploratory moves into a region far 
different from the commercial fishing hubs along Bristol Bay. Several hundred miles 
north and slightly west of the Pebble deposit, ten miles north of the Kuskokwim River, 
prospectors had first located gold at the Donlin site as far back as the early 1900s, but it 
wasn’t until further exploration from 1995 to 2000 that the Donlin gold deposit emerged 
as a potential site for modern, industrial scale mineral development. Smaller than Pebble 
but with a higher concentration of valuable metals, Donlin received its strongest 
sponsorship from the Calista Corporation, which holds subsurface title to the mineral site, 
as well as varying degrees of support from the villages of the Yukon-Kuskokwim region 
that would see benefits in employment and infrastructure. By the time Pebble was 
beginning to see the formation of strong resistance coalitions around 2006, Donlin Gold 
was just a few years from submitting permit applications to the state of Alaska and the 
Army Corps of Engineers; and by the time the EPA issued a controversial (and, as it 
turned out, temporary) preemptive veto of the Pebble plan in 2014, Donlin’s Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) was just months from completion. Pebble and 
Donlin, similar in size and technical complexity but with widely divergent economic and 
political contexts, therefore represent an especially interesting pair of complementary 
case studies in the politics of remote resource development, impact assessment, and 
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sovereignty. Pebble, as we will see, demonstrates the capacity of well-funded and diverse 
resistance coalitions to slow mineral development by working prior to and outside of 
established impact assessment procedures. Donlin, in the economically challenged 
Yukon-Kuskokwim region, emerges as a contrasting case in which resistance to mineral 
development was without a supportive commercial industry – and where its opponents 
were therefore limited to acting, cautiously and carefully, within the bounds of the public 
input directives set down by the DEIS process. 
By some measures little had changed between 1880 and the early 2000s beyond 
the understandable shifts in population, mining technology, and economies of scale. 
Heavy industry and Placer mines replaced prospectors and their gold-pans, and low-grade 
industrial projects replaced Placer mines in turn, but the promises of profit underground 
continued to capture settler imaginaries and mediate state politics, land use policy, and 
economies in ways that are both particular to the Alaskan context and that reflect wider 
US colonial projects. By the time the mineral sites at Donlin and Pebble were first 
mapped in the late 1990s, the equation of land with extractive profit in Alaska was 
neither new nor novel. Decades of extractive resource development had made that point 
clear, bolstered in 1959 by Alaska’s new statehood agreement that mandated state-owned 
land be used to provide for “resources to support the state's economy.” It was no surprise 
that by 2008 then-governor and vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin had become a 
vocal supporter of the Pebble plan, and her chant of “mine, baby, mine” would have been 
at-home in 19th century Sitka as it was on the 2008 campaign trail.3 If the Juneau claim 
																																																								
3 Just two years earlier, during her initial run for governorship, Palin had trumpeted the opposite position at 
a campaign stop in the Bristol Bay village of Ekwok. “I am a commercial fisherman; my daughter’s name 
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represented the first case in which questions of land use, power, and resource 
development in Alaska found a focus underground, then the Donlin and Pebble mine 
represent the latest.  
Contemporary regimes of land use, knowledge, and power were not a given in 
1880, however; rather, the ideologies and practices surrounding resource development in 
Alaska solidified in material reality and in discursive politics over the decades that 
separate Pebble and Donlin from the early days of the Juneau deposit. As familiar as 
Palin’s boosterism may have appeared by 2008, the procedural, environmental, and 
ethical questions surrounding Alaskan mining had nevertheless grown increasingly 
complex in the intervening century. Alaska’s frontier ideology today is joined by another 
approach to understanding land and politics, less publicized but just as representative of 
the contemporary status of Alaskan natural resource management: the growth of powerful 
environmental and conservation movements and movements organizing around Native 
sovereignty. These, in turn, have been met with new regulatory regimes designed to 
mediate emerging challenges to the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources and 
to contain realms of acceptable dissent to the legal, the legislative, and the procedural. 
Mine permitting today has ballooned to become a decades-long process. A 
complex web of multiple stakeholders, competing interests, and contradictory studies 
surround a highly contested exploration and permitting phase, especially with regards to 
baseline data collection and the preliminary preparation of environmental impact 
assessments. As a marker of its distinct environmental and symbolic importance, 
Pebble’s permitting process has also been dogged by a collection of lawsuits and 
																																																																																																																																																																					
is Bristol,” she said. “I could not support a project that risks one resource that we know is a given, and that 
is the world’s richest spawning grounds, over another resource.” (NYT, 2008) 
	 8	
countersuits carried out by federal agencies, mining companies, and a coalition of 
conservation organizations and Native groups. By the early 2000s, mine permitting (and 
the contestations over the Pebble and Donlin projects in particular) played out largely in 
esoteric and expert realms, a frontier story far removed from Alaska’s early imaginations 
of individual exploration and “striking it big.” How, then, did Alaskan mineral 
development shift from an operation that was primarily concerned with finding and 
staking a claim, to one where the claim itself mattered less than the quality of knowledge 
that could be produced to bolster its safety and viability? How did land use policy 
develop in tandem with practices of knowledge production and land and resource 
imaginaries?  
Sub-surface resource industries are technically and economically massive 
enterprises. They represent the bulk of development and growth activity in many regions; 
they furnish raw materials for other technoscientific ventures; they contribute 
substantially to a country’s or a region’s wealth; and they are in turn implicated in 
ideologies and economies of nation-building. While sub-surface resource initiatives may 
result in the irreparable loss of ecosystem health and services, such losses are to some 
extent seen as necessary sacrifices to sustain consumptive comforts and to fulfill visions 
of collective good and potential attainable futures. The ideologies and imaginaries at play 
in major sub-surface resource projects, though they may not serve direct local needs, are 
carefully constructed exercises of state power and necessarily entail projects of managing 
political dissent.  
“Land use,” here, takes on a multiple layers of coincident meaning. These include 
the varying modes by which peoples, societies, and institutions relate to the land, the 
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processes by which knowledge of the land is constructed and legitimated, and the ways in 
which land imaginaries intersect with discourses of identity, culture, nationalism or 
regionalism, and history. The Pebble and Donlin cases must be understood within this 
particular history of the remaking of discursive landscapes throughout the long period of 
colonial contact in Alaska. Local resistance strategies, in this view, are simultaneously 
movements to protect the land-based foundations of cultures and livelihoods as well as 
movements for onto-epistemic justice. With this in mind, this thesis is at its core a 
critique of the knowledge construction practices surrounding land use policy and large 
project impact assessment, conducted through the lens of two case studies in the 
resistance strategies of diverse coalitions of local activists, outside supporters, and expert 
consultants.   
Constructions of Land and Resources 
This research relies, in part, on a study of the social construction of lands, 
resources, and knowledges. This refers to the capacity of particular resources to hold 
value, significance, and meaning, insofar as they can be seen through patterns of social 
relations, land use practices, and knowledge construction (Wehling, 2006). Profitable 
resources, as they are viewed by state and industry accountants, are co-constructed 
alongside local land imaginaries and cultures – that is, by the active work of specific 
social groups to define themselves in relation to the material landscape, in specific places 
at specific times. The significance of individual resources and the landscape of resource 
discourses they exist within are dynamic, socio-politically and economically constructed 
conditions. The landscape of meanings attached to a specific place shifts, however, as 
particular aspects of a site’s natural resources assume dominant significance and value. 
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What resources are given importance and value is not the direct product of local supply to 
meet local demand; resource value, rather, is discursively constructed, and has long been 
shaped by contested social, political, and economic discourses. Through these socially 
and politically contested processes, dominant resources come to stand in for the place 
itself; at the same time, they overshadow other resource characteristics, and limit the land 
and resource possibilities of a place to fit to a narrow set of imaginative boundaries 
(Davidov, 2014). The dominance of extractive, profitable resource imaginaries in Alaska 
can thus be seen as an artifact of power, co-produced alongside the hegemonic economic, 
political, and epistemological systems of the day, in relation to state-building, national 
projects, and the constant material and discursive contests over national and sub-national 
identities (Jasanoff, 2005, 2009).  
The logics of global capitalism often dictate which resources gain dominant 
standing and have the capacity to produce short-term profit for private enterprise and for 
the state. Even as these dominant extractive and profitable constructs render nature 
productive and valuable for human use, however, hegemonic visions of the land and its 
resources subsist in a rich environment of other (pre)existing discourses that are 
inseparable from questions of social, environmental, and cognitive justice. Davidov 
(2014) reminds us that by the processes of social organization that allow for resource 
exploitation – commodification, extraction, and profit – nature is simultaneously 
endangered, with consequences for alternate imaginaries, indigenous sovereignty, and the 
legibility of local knowledge practices to the state and other powerful, non-local actors. 
In this view, dominant land and resource imaginations themselves require the 
consideration of alternative regimes of value, and may spur the organization of strategies 
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that unite and empower local environmental and conservation movements. These counter 
resource imaginaries need not be uniformly opposed to and incompatible with extractive 
profiteering and sub-surface resource imaginaries and practices; in fact there can be broad 
differences within counter coalitions in their material valuations and approaches to land 
and its resources. These counter-discourses and social or civic deliberative valuations, in 
turn, may work to build alternate imaginations and relationships to land, and may 
forefront environmentally friendly development strategies or development initiatives that 
incorporate higher precautionary risk thresholds. More narrowly, it is through the 
contested field of social imagination that a resource gains potential and standing, is given 
coherence and identity, and is altered in ways both mundane and radical (Barad, 2012; 
Castoriadis, 1997; Gaonkar, 2002). 
While not as well known among anthropologists or social scientists as it may be 
among subsistence and commercial fishing activists, the Pebble controversy has 
nonetheless inspired a small academic canon. Hebert and Brock (2016) take special care 
to document the construction of alternative visions of the land promoted by anti-Pebble 
activists in Bristol Bay, particularly the counter-mapping projects undertaken by Bristol 
Bay communities as an act of redefining and “assembling new publics in opposition to 
resource-extractive designs.” Holley and Mitcham’s (2015) work, as well as Hebert’s 
(2016) analysis of “overflows,” show, too, how participants in Pebble’s early dialogue 
processes effectively contested official interpretations of scientific data and 
reappropriated Pebble’s data for their own ends. “Anglo American was incorrect in 
assuming that all participants would interpret the science to reveal the mine as safe,” 
write Holley and Mitcham (2015). Rather, “stakeholders were able to develop their own 
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interpretations” (p. 24). In Hebert’s (2016) telling, the inability of the process to contain 
participant interaction and understanding spurred generative effects and “new visions that 
remake spatial, social, and temporal relations in the face of imperilment” (p. 108). 
Lawyer Geoffrey Y. Parker has also been involved in some of the land use and 
jurisdictional debates surrounding Pebble; his 2008 study of Alaska’s Large Mine 
Permitting Process formed the core of the early claims by Bristol Bay residents and 
activists that Alaska’s permitting process may not be capable of handling a mine with the 
size and risk potential of the Pebble project (Parker et al, 2008). None of the permitting 
statutes administered by the state “specifically address modern, large scale mining, such 
as the Pebble Mine, that exploits massive, low-grade ore deposits,” write Parker et al. 
“Some of the statutes were enacted before the risks of contemporary mining of massive, 
low-grade, metallic sulfide ores posed to ecosystems were widely recognized” (p. 30). 
While the Donlin conflict itself has thus far escaped sustained academic 
engagement, the Yukon-Kuskokwim region has seen extensive traditional knowledge 
documentation through a particular cooperation between academic researchers, the 
Calista Regional Corporation, and a body of traditional knowledge practitioners and 
community leaders known as the Calista Elders Council (CEC). Anthropologist Ann 
Fienup-Riordan and translator Alice Rearden have been working alongside the CEC since 
at least the early 2000s. Their work, from a 2003 in-depth project with Yup’ik elder Paul 
John, to a 2012 collection on traditional understandings of the land and weather patterns, 
to a 2016 collection of place narratives and traditional teachings recorded in collaboration 
with CEC elders, remains one of the most complete contemporary catalogues of Native 
Alaskan place-based traditional ecological knowledge. Perhaps in part due to their close 
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working relationship with the Calista Corporation, which holds subsurface rights to the 
Donlin site and is Donlin Gold’s primary supporter, Rearden and Fienup-Riordan’s work 
has yet to look into questions of industrial development as they relate to traditional 
knowledges or subsistence practices on the Kuskokwim.  
Resource conflicts are entangled with questions of social justice, and constitute a 
platform for imagining more just, sustainable, inclusive and environmentally efficient 
economies and societies. Local movements linked to resource practices provide a strong 
foundation for an intersectional politics across race and culture, for renewable and 
sustainable practices, and for the democratization of resource use (Agyeman et al, 2016). 
These attachments are relational and originate in peoples’ interaction with the physical, 
the political, and the environmental world around them. Deliberative valuations which 
arise naturally and locally through sustained practice perhaps promise more democratic 
approaches to land and resource imagination and use than those based solely on 
economic dictates.  
Methodology 
This research draws upon a variety of qualitative methods, including over eighty 
in-depth interviews with members of industrial, state, federal, civil, and scientific 
communities and a thorough interpretive analysis of administrative, scientific, regulatory, 
media and public documents. Interview data is drawn from three rounds of personal, 
semi-structured interviews. Bindu Panikkar conducted extensive interviews in Anchorage 
and the Bristol Bay region in July and August 2014, meeting with nonprofits, state and 
federal regulators, tribal officials, activists, and community members. Benjamin 
Lemmond and I expanded on this set of interview data in January of 2017, focusing on 
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state and federal regulators, activists, and nonprofit consultants working on issues related 
to the Donlin permitting process in Anchorage, Fairbanks, and the Kenai Peninsula, as 
well as two extended interviews with the permit manager at Donlin Gold and members of 
the Calista Corporation board of directors. Panikkar and I developed the third round of 
interview in July and August 2017 through a series of conversations with community 
members, activists, and officials in the Kuskokwim River villages of Aniak, Napaimute, 
and Crooked Creek, as well as two of interviews with the Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI). 
Interviews were conducted in person, except in cases where it was necessary to interview 
remotely, and all interviews were audio recorded.  
Data coding and analysis of documents, interviews, and observations were 
performed with HyperResearch, a program for data entry, coding, sorting and retrieval. 
Scientific publications, reports, media releases, public testimony, and other outreach 
materials were also integrated into this analysis. The University of Vermont Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approved interview questionnaires and all study procedures. An oral 
consent to participate was sought from each of the interview participants, and all data 
were de-identified at the time of transcriptions unless the participant has given consent to 
use their name. All participants were 18 years of age or older. 
Interview data is combined with a brief content analysis of the 526 public 
comments submitted to the US Army Corps of Engineers as part of the Donlin Gold Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) process. Benjamin Lemmond performed the 
primary coding of the public comment data according to the major areas of concern that 
the comments identified, and I worked to bin the comments according to a smaller set of 
major themes. This content analysis allows us to count the number of public comments 
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that mention specific components of the DEIS process, as well as to understand the 
relative importance of different issues as they arose through the lens of the DEIS. 
“Problems are not simply objectively big or small,” but are instead dynamically shaped 
and resized by the symbols and frames used to address them (Birkland, 1997, p. 14). 
Public construction of a “problem,” therefore, rests in part on the contested 
communication of interpretative frames and packages of meaning. Public comment data 
make up a smaller portion of this project, but this analysis of the role of public comments 
in shaping risk communication and conversations around public knowledge will feature 
in a future publication.   
Thesis Outline 
Chapter two, below, traces the development of Alaskan land use policy through a 
history of US colonization to understand how policy has shaped new regimes of 
knowledge, power, and political economy in relation to resource extraction. This chapter 
looks both to land policy specific to Alaska, and to the effects of a number of national 
conservation and management acts on Alaska’s politics of land use, knowledge, and 
power, in order to address two central questions: How did Alaskan land use policy 
develop from the Juneau deposit in 1880 to the present-day controversies in Bristol Bay 
and the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta? And, by extension, how were Western definitions of 
land as a site of profit and ownership imported to or imposed upon the Alaskan territory?  
Chapter three turns to the Pebble controversy. Expanding on chapter one’s 
discussion of the contentious history of land policy and ideology in Alaska, this chapter 
looks to a set of land use and management decisions that sought to centralize state control 
over the discourses and deliberative processes surrounding land use decision making in 
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Bristol Bay. More importantly, this chapter also addresses the role of community 
members, activists, and expert consultants in challenging extractive land imaginaries, 
promoting subsistence-based approaches to the land, and making space for traditional 
knowledge and locally-rooted deliberative processes within the technical debates 
surrounding mine permitting. This chapter was developed jointly with Bindu Panikkar, 
and parts of the work presented here appear in a forthcoming article slated for publication 
in Social Studies of Science. 
Chapter four moves to the Yukon-Kuskokwim and the public engagement work 
surrounding Donlin’s environmental impact assessment process. This chapter begins with 
an outline of land history specific to the Yukon-Kuskokwim region before moving on to 
the public engagement process that followed Donlin’s Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement, including a brief analysis of the 526 public comments that followed the 
release of the DEIS in November 2015. Chapter three concludes with a discussion of the 
cooperation between consultants and Kuskokwim-area community leaders, activists, and 
citizens. In contrast with Pebble, where activists and consultants were able to build a 
powerful movement outside of and prior to the state permitting and impact assessment 
process, the coalitions that arose to oppose the Donlin project channeled their work 
through the state’s official public engagement processes – in part, due to a set of 
complexities surrounding land use, sovereignty, and development politics specific to the 
Yukon-Kuskokwim region. 
If the first chapter is concerned with the role of state and federal land use policy in 
making extractive capitalism an on-the-ground reality, the subsequent chapters are 
concerned with the reverse – that is, with the power of local action to resist the material, 
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procedural, and epistemic components of extraction and extractive ideologies in ways 
that are tailored to regional contexts of power, knowledge, and land title. Both chapters 
necessarily address the place of subsistence in contemporary Alaskan life. This project 
concludes, therefore, with a brief treatment of the challenges and promises of subsistence 
practices in Alaska today.  
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CHAPTER 2: LAND POLICY IN AK 
Land use policy in contemporary Alaska is more than a question of law, 
legislation, geography, or cartography. Land use policy shapes how people conceive of 
and relate to the land; how land is adjudicated and imagined; who has the right, or the 
ability, to be on, in, or near the land itself; and who has access to participate in the 
processes of decision-making where land and its uses are delineated and realized. Policy 
shapes and reflects the ideologies and practices of the past as well as possibilities or 
imaginations for the future. That the Bristol Bay or Yukon-Kuskokwim regions would 
play host to large, extractive development sites was hardly on the minds of settlers or 
Alaska Natives in 1880. That land could be owned and profited off of, and that those 
profits could accumulate as capital – this, too, was not written into the Alaskan landscape 
any more than it was in the ontological imaginations of its indigenous residents. Rather, 
Alaskan ontological landscapes today are the result of the long-term construction of 
hybrid practices built out of the linked material and discursive interactions between 
Native Alaskans and white American settler-colonizers. To consider the construction of 
Alaskan land, therefore, requires an analytical scope that begins long before the discovery 
of profitable minerals at the Pebble and Donlin sites in the 1990s. Here, we look to a 
longer-term view of Alaskan land history from US acquisition to the Pebble and Donlin 
controversies today. 
This chapter traces the construction of Alaska as a resource colony through the 
operationalization of particular land use policies and other key defining moments in 
Alaskan land history, especially in terms of their role to supplant indigenous subsistence-
based land relations with colonial imaginaries of profit and ownership. It explores four 
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key moments in federal and state action that are central to understanding the construction 
of land imaginaries and development potentials that run through the Pebble and Donlin 
debates: the US purchase of the Alaskan territory from Russia in 1867; Alaska’s 
statehood in 1959; the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA) in 1971; and the 
Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act (ANILCA) in 1980. This analysis will 
trace the broad processes by which Alaskan land was remade as a site for private 
ownership, profit, and resource commodification and exploitation.  
Purchase 
The purchase of Alaska in 1867 from Russia for $7.2 million, though widely 
ridiculed at the time, has come to be seen as a geographic masterstroke, providing the US 
with an abundance of domestic natural resources in mineral, oil and gas as well as a point 
of access to the Arctic Ocean. Expansionist William H. Seward, a wealthy New Yorker 
and secretary of state under Lincoln, took the lead in pushing the purchase deal. Seward 
operated under a creed of expansion and commerce; his vision would be fulfilled, at least 
in Alaska, with the acquisition of new territories not by military force but by the 
misleadingly benign act of purchase. “Peace is more propitious to the ruling passion of 
empire than war,” said Seward in 1844, “and the provinces are more cheaply bought than 
conquered.” He reaffirmed his belief in Alaska’s resource promise with a trip to the 
Northern British Territories in 1857, where he saw “the element of wealth” in the 
region’s  “broad ranges of the chase at the North, its inexhaustible lumber lands, the most 
extensive now remaining on the globe, its invaluable fisheries, and its yet undisturbed 
mines.” Seward would have to wait until after the last shot of the US Civil War, fired off 
the coast of Russian America in 1865, to realize his expansionist scheme. A flurry of 
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diplomatic activity finalized the territory transfer on March 30, 1867, with little fanfare – 
as negotiations had been conducted outside of public view to forestall the possibility of 
Britain entering the bidding. US land holdings in the Alaska Territory totaled roughly 375 
million acres, more than two and a half times the size of Texas. The borders of the new 
territory were murky, defined by an 1825 treaty between Russia and Britain, and it took 
until 1903 for the boundaries between Alaska and Canada to fully resolve.  
The purchase agreement stipulated that Russian residents could either return to 
Russia or remain as full US citizens. In contrast, the new treaty neatly ignored Native 
populations. Indigenous communities, including the Aleut, the southwestern Yup’ik, the 
northern Inupiaq, the interior Athabascan and the southeastern Tlingit and Haida, were 
largely autonomous prior to US colonization. While an imperial decree claimed Russian 
dominion over Aleutians, and while Russian commercial expansion along the coast was 
often accompanied by aggressive missionary activity, the Russian government held little 
practical authority over hunters and traders, be they Russian or Native Alaskan. Native 
Alaskans were not consulted on the transfer of their territory from Russian to American 
colonial control, however, nor were they given the option to opt out of US administration 
like Alaska’s Russian residents. Native populations were granted neither US citizenship 
nor recognized sovereignty, and their claims to land were systematically ignored. Indeed, 
the US-Russia agreement stipulated that the change in title would not impact still-
unresolved Native land claims (Culp et al, 2005). In contrast with the Russian approach, 
however, US colonial governance going forward crystallized around policies that brought 
disparate tribes and the territory as a whole under centralized authority, in part by 
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instituting policies of socio-structural control, to manage the landscapes and resources the 
federal government saw as politically and economically valuable (Mass, 1991).  
Alaska’s value, as Seward observed, rested firmly on its resource potential. 
This was a departure from trends in the contiguous West, where agrarian settlement and 
space for population expansion were central to frontier imaginations. Westward-bound 
settlers had moved toward the Pacific with oxen in front and plow in tow, but Alaska’s 
state and federal managers never pegged the region as America’s next breadbasket. Poet 
Bret Harte captured the resource visions of Alaska’s most enthusiastic boosters, despite 
never having laid eyes on the territory himself (Emmerson, 2010). 
There’s a right smart chance for fur chase 
All along this recent purchase, 
And, unless the stories fail, 
Every fish from cod to whale. 
Rocks too – mebbe quartz – lets see, 
‘Twould be strange if there should be, 
Seems I’ve heard such stories told, 
Eh – why, bless us – yes, its gold  
The potential value of the territory remained the subject of strong debate – indeed, 
Russia had rid itself of the territory partly due to the collapse of its once-lucrative fur 
trade – and white settlement in the early years of the purchase was minimal. 4 It would 
take until the 1880 expeditions, years after Seward’s death, for the decision once derided 
as “Seward’s folly” to prove its worth underground. Alaska’s drastic population shifts in 
																																																								
4 Population data in this section is drawn from Sandberg (2013). 
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the years that followed illustrate the power that subsurface resources held over Seward’s 
new acquisition. When Juneau and Harris first set out for Gold Creek in 1880, Alaska’s 
first census reported only 430 white settlers out of the 33,426 people it reached, more 
than a third of whom lived in the territorial capitol of Sitka. These numbers were not 
substantially different from an 1839 population estimate by Ioann Veniaminov, a Russian 
Orthodox missionary – though his count was higher than those of his contemporaries. By 
the 1900 census, however, Alaska’s population had ballooned to over sixty thousand, 
nearly half of European descent. A full ninety percent of white Alaskans were male: As 
in the early days of the California mining boom, new residents were overwhelmingly men 
traveling alone. 
Gold in the Klondike grew to overshadow Juneau’s reputation and Nome, a gold 
boomtown on the Seward Peninsula, soon eclipsed Juneau’s population, growing to 
nearly twenty percent of the territory’s population at over 12,000 residents – though by 
1910 its population fell to just over a thousand as gold tracts ran dry. By then, mining 
companies were increasingly relying on large claims that required relatively few workers; 
though a handful of large mines had existed in Alaska since the first gold rush in the 
1800s, including mines dedicated to both coal (Usebeli Coal Mine) and hard-rock mining 
(Kennicott, Bateson, Hirst Chicagof, Treadwell, and others), it took until the early 1900s 
for Alaskan mining to solidify as a corporate endeavor.  
Fishing soon took precedence as the primary vehicle for population shifts in the 
Alaska territory. Southeast Alaska’s share of Alaska’s population grew from 23.6 percent 
to 34.8 from 1910 to 1940, and Juneau regained its status as the territory’s largest city 
largely thanks to the growing fishing industry. Juneau’s renewed centrality was short 
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lived, however, and the Alaskan population would shift permanently to the Anchorage 
area with the rise of Alaska’s strategic military importance, the 1939 and 1940 
construction of military bases in Anchorage and Fairbanks, and the extension of the US 
road network to both cities in 1942. Many subsurface projects were shuttered in favor of 
increased military activity in the years following World War II, and mining would never 
again produce the kind of drastic and volatile population shifts that it had at the turn of 
the century. While Juneau and Nome remained viable population centers after the closure 
of local mine sites, the areas surrounding newer, larger mining projects were often left 
deserted after closure. 
Statehood for Alaska 
Truman first recommended statehood for Alaska in 1946, though his initial 
proposal was delayed due to partisan opposition and doubts on the financial capability of 
the state (Mass, 1991). State control of land for the purposes of resource exploitation was 
outlined as an early goal of Alaska’s negotiators: The territorial legislature’s 1955 
constitutional draft dedicated the state to the endeavors of settlement and resource 
development, and when Eisenhower proclaimed Alaska the forty-ninth state on January 3, 
1959, more than a decade after Truman’s initial recommendation, the agreement entitled 
the fledgling state to select 102.5 million acres from the public domain for its own use 
(Gallagher and Gasbarro, 1989).5 The purpose of the entitlement, which amounted to 28 
percent of the state’s land area and was twenty times larger than other state entitlements, 
																																																								
5 The 1959 agreement was a deviation from previous state land grant policies in which specific, federally 
mandated parcels of land were transferred to state governments after the territories had already experience 
substantial white settlement. 
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was to provide a financial base from which the new state could generate funds from land 
and resource sales.  
Alaskan statehood was opposed by mining and fishing interests that were wary of 
the increased regulatory power granted to the new state government (Parker).6 But private 
interests did not have long to wait before the regulatory systems they feared would turn to 
work in their favor. In the same stroke, the coalescence of government and private 
industry would also resolve the lingering question of Native land claims just as it had in 
the West: with a land privatization scheme driven by the prospect of large scale, 
profitable resource development.  
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
State land selection processes raised the issue of development and Native rights to 
a critical level in rural Alaska. Alaska was initially included on the United Nations 1946 
list of Trust and Non Self-Governing Territories. Where most territories were removed 
from the list following independence, including Namibia in 1990 and mostly recently 
East Timor in 2002, Alaska was disenrolled upon its entry into statehood – despite the 
fact that Alaska Natives were not included on the voting rolls for Alaska’s statehood 
proposal nor were Native land claims, sovereignty, or political status given weight in 
either the decision-making or the process by which Alaska’s new state government was 
																																																								
6 This private opposition to statehood would prove misappropriated, and the federal government would 
ultimately prove a stronger conservationist voice than the state of Alaska. In 1980, Congress set aside over 
157 million acres of federal Alaskan land for national parks, wildlife refuges, and other protected areas 
under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). National parks make up roughly 54 
million acres of Alaskan land today, nearly a quarter of the federal government’s total Alaskan holdings; 
state parks, in contrast, account for just 3.3 million acres, less than 4% of Alaska’s 103 million acres of 
state land, and Alaska’s state government has proven one of the strongest proponents for expanded oil and 
gas expansion on the North Slope and throughout the state.  (National Park Service; Division of Parks and 
Outdoor Recreation). 
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organized. As new state land appropriations encroached upon Native villages and 
subsistence areas, however, Native communities responded with a series of requests to 
freeze the selection process until their claims to land could be heard (Alaska Native 
Foundation, 1978). But it would not be enough to spur federal action on its own.  
Ten years after Alaska gained statehood, in 1969, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 
System (a cooperative venture between ARCO, BP Oil, and Humble Oil, later Exxon) 
submitted an application for the construction of a 1270 kilometer pipeline from oil 
deposits at Prudhoe Bay to ports at Valdez on Prince William Sound. Pipeline 
construction was stalled, however, by the series of unresolved land claims overlapping 
the pipeline corridor. Native opposition prompted the suspension of land transfers by 
Secretary of the Interior Steward Udall in 1966. All public lands were withdrawn from 
appropriation, and the Bureau of Land Management was prohibited from processing 
mineral leases or patent land titles until Congress could act. This and the promise of a 
domestic source of oil profit provided a strong incentive to restart state land selection and 
reopen mineral leasing, and the pipeline inspired quick legislative compromise by the 
Nixon administration. In 1971, after several years of negotiation between federal, state, 
and tribal entities, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) emerged as a 
solution to the impasse. ANCSA would erase Native claims and remove existing Native 
reserves with the transfer of 44 million acres of land and a lump monetary payment of 
962 million dollars to thirteen newly established Regional Native Corporations. Regional 
Corporations would function as private, for-profit companies, with Native Alaskan 
residents as their shareholders, and land selection would proceed similarly to the state 
process that had begun a decade before.  
	 26	
Congress quickly approved the pipeline project when vice-president Spiro Agnew 
cast the tie-breaking vote on July 17, 1973, and the pipeline system was fully completed 
by June of 1977. Twelve years later, on March 24, 1989, more than eleven million 
gallons of Prudhoe Bay oil flowed into Prince William Sound when the Exxon Valdez 
tanker ran aground just miles from the pipeline’s terminus. Media coverage of soiled 
beaches and oiled wildlife challenged ideologies of unmitigated development and 
resituated the fragility of human and natural environments; the debates over prospective 
resource development projects today arguably recreate these ambivalences surrounding 
concepts of conservation, development, sovereignty, and knowledge. 
ANCSA introduced a system of land use and sovereignty that was a drastic 
departure from reservation policy in the West and from Native Alaskan land use practices 
of the day – driven and organized, again, around the extraction of profit from the land. 
Today, Alaska Native land ownership is primarily concentrated in private land titles 
assigned to the Regional Corporations. Tribal sovereignty, meanwhile, exists at the level 
of Village Corporations, which own small tracts of land surrounding the boundaries of 
established tribal villages. The vast majority of Native Alaskan land, as a result, is not 
sovereign territory. Rather, it is “owned” in the same way that any other private 
individual owns land in Alaska: as a deed filed with the state. Regional Corporations, 
meanwhile, hold the same fiduciary duty as other shareholder-owned companies to 
maximize profit for their constituents. Local development, employment, and social 
services in part rely on the ability of Regional Corporations to effectively manage their 
assets. As Regional Corporation assets are primarily composed of their land holdings, 
fiduciary duty and local development needs effectively require that Regional 
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Corporations manage their land in a manner that increases capital accumulation. In 
Alaska, land profit hinges most often on the exploitation of oil and mineral deposits. 
Besides imposing a mandate of land profitability, the Native Corporation system 
introduced under ANCSA also served to divide land designation from political 
sovereignty. Political representation, in the form of government-to-government 
relationships with the U.S., is vested within each individual village. Village Corporations, 
however, control only the land’s surface; subsurface title, including oil, mineral, or other 
resource deposits, remains under the management of the Regional Corporations. Both 
Regional and Village Corporations are tasked with ensuring the economic well being of 
the Alaska Native population through profit generated from their respective landholdings. 
Native Corporations are thus caught within a system of competing incentives, where 
economic survival and financial independence depends, to a degree, on opening land for 
commercial resource extraction. That extraction, meanwhile, not only has the potential 
for disastrous geological-environmental consequences, but also represents a concrete 
enforcement of land use and land ideology as profit-oriented and privately owned. The 
resource development mandate implied by land profitability in this way has the capacity 
to threaten subsistence culture and resources – some of the most immediate concerns of 
rural village residents – putting regional development in a particular kind of conflict with 
the needs and concerns of the people who live there (Gallagher, 1987). Faith Gemmill, 
Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands (REDOIL) organizer, 
describes: 
In a nutshell, [ANCSA] was a theft of our lands as it transfers our tradition [and] 
land…from true authority, which were the tribes of Alaska, to the Native 
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Corporations which were created under that act. Then it was intended to 
assimilate [Native Alaskans], take [us] away what we value the most and 
assimilate us...It was an act to divide us and conquer us. It’s served that purpose 
in a lot of ways, as tribes’ whole purpose is to look on the well-being of the 
people. A corporation’s purpose is the bottom line, profit at all cost, and these are 
two different value systems that are in place now throughout Alaska within Native 
communities. (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
In contrast with the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), 
which involved similar ideations of resource development and transfers of land title for 
financial assurances, ANCSA also held little regard for protecting rural subsistence 
lifestyles and livelihoods. While the JBNQA codified ongoing state support for 
subsistence hunters and trappers in the form of direct subsidies as well as land use and 
access preferences, ANCSA held no such guarantee for subsistence hunters, trappers, or 
fishers (Peel, 2013). To Mass (1991), ANCSA implied that Natives be “assimilated into 
the American mainstream; away from a communal subsistence orientation to a political 
economy of private ownership, individualism, a competitive market, limited government 
and popular passivity” (p. 36). 
But ANCSA also represented a shift in US treaty history that should not be 
ignored. Seward’s creed that “the provinces are more cheaply bought than conquered” 
came in the midst of decades of powerful, militant resistance to US conquest on the part 
of American Indians in the contiguous states. Applied to the Alaska context a hundred 
years later, Seward’s words take on a different, if related, connotation, and instead speak 
to the effective use of particular kinds of political power by Alaska Native groups in the 
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20th and 21st century. With ANCSA, indigenous nations under US occupation were for 
the first time able to ensure that they had a seat at the negotiating table. Alaska today 
holds the largest tracts of Native-owned (though not sovereign) land, and Regional 
Native Corporations remain highly profitable and well placed to negotiate on strong 
terms with federal, state, and outside corporate interests. “ANCSA was a success due to a 
lot of creativity on the part of Native people,” recalls one member of the Calista board of 
directors who had been involved in the initial negotiations in the 1970s. Despite the 
difficulty of transitioning to what she terms a Western business model, communities were 
able to “adapt to the style of boardroom meetings.”  
Two central processes stand out in the period between the Juneau deposit in the 
1880s and the Donlin and Pebble projects today. First, land designation was increasingly 
reorganized to favor American capitalism and private property ownership, whether 
through the breakup of reservations in the contiguous states or, under ANCSA, as a first 
resort to settle land claims in Alaska. Reimagining land as private property also meant the 
dissolution of tribal sovereignty, again through the breakup of reservation land in the 
lower 48 (that had functioned as a limited form of sovereign space) or, in Alaska, by 
designating the vast majority of Native areas as privately titled land subject to state and 
federal jurisdiction. Second, federal policy consistently favored an ideology of land as an 
improvable, profitable resource. From land grants to private farmers that were contingent 
on clearing land for agriculture to policies that granted private access to mining claims 
and oil fields, agriculture and resource development were consistently considered as the 
optimal, most “civilized” use of land in the contiguous states and Alaska alike. It was 
land improvement, moreover, that served as the impetus for wide-ranging settlement and 
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land designation policies – with the pipeline controversy that formed the backdrop to 
ANCSA as one of the more dramatic examples. Arguably, the remaking of land as a 
privately held, profitable resource was central to the broad mission to disintegrate and 
assimilate Native communities – and to open larger tracts of land to resource 
development, settlement, and agriculture. For Chickaloon Village Chief Gary Harrison, 
changes in land designation are inseparable from questions of power and humanity: 
Under ANCSA, “it’s easier to take over your right as a human being, as you are no longer 
human, but just a stockholder” (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014). At the same time, 
in other interpretations, the compromises built in to the ANCSA agreement have allowed 
for a level of Native economic power that is almost unheard of elsewhere within the 
borders drawn by US and European settlers. While later agreements may have allowed 
for a degree of political sovereignty absent from the Alaska context – the 1993 that 
settlement paved the way for Inuit self-governance in Canada’s Nunavut territory is 
perhaps the most relevant example – the relative success of Alaska Native business 
ventures is undeniably a historically significant outcome, severe social and economic 
challenges in some localities notwithstanding. 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
The problem of political sovereignty, however, implies a number of major 
consequences for rural lives and livelihoods. Sovereign land holdings as defined under 
ANCSA were often insufficient to support subsistence lifestyles, as the land tracts 
allotted to Native villages were significantly smaller than the large land base that 
subsistence hunting and gathering requires (Gallagher, 1987). That the patchwork of land 
rights and jurisdictions that developed through statehood and ANCSA made subsistence 
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survival on Native land effectively impossible, moreover, created a situation where rural 
subsistence communities are necessarily dependent on access to land beyond the 
boundaries of the village. This material reality engenders an additional dependency on 
state and federal legislation to protect habitat in, and subsistence access to, tracts of non-
Native land adjacent to traditional subsistence grounds. As ecosystems and habitats do 
not conform to messy land title boundaries, subsistence practices even on Native territory 
rely on broader protections than simply those areas where subsistence takes place; 
survival on (and the survival of) subsistence practices remain in deep jeopardy. I will 
return to a discussion of subsistence at the end of this thesis. 
 Partial relief was coded into the 1980 Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA), which set aside 225 million acres for conservation (60% of 
land under federal ownership, 28% under state, and 12% under Native ownership) and 
recognized that land held by Native communities would not be sufficient to support 
subsistence. ANILCA Title VIII established Native subsistence use priority on most 
federal lands, stipulating that subsistence users should be the first to access limited land 
resources; wildlife refuges were additionally made available for subsistence harvest, but 
national parks were to be closed to fishing and hunting. State officials challenged these 
new regulations, however, arguing that Native priority conflicted with the state’s 
constitutional definition of natural resources as belonging to all residents, and subsistence 
priority was ultimately extended to all rural Alaskans. In one stroke, ANILCA codified 
subsistence access as the responsibility of the federal government, rather than the state – 
a controversial shift in Alaskan land politics, given the state’s position that it should hold 
sole responsibility for resource management (Peel, 2013)  
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ANILCA land designations were controversial in Bristol Bay. In 1979, the Bristol 
Bay Native Corporation sued, arguing that federal protected land withdrawals reduced the 
value of theirs ANCSA land by limiting access to the coast in areas of potential mineral 
development – another example of the double incentive coded into Alaska’s land system. 
ANILCA is less a consequence in the Pebble region, however, where the federal 
government holds a smaller proportion of the land compared to the rest of the state. Much 
of the Bristol Bay area – 18.9 million acres out of the 48.8 million acre planning area – 
belongs to the state of Alaska, and state land classifications are not so immutable (Alaska 
Department of Natural Resources, 2005). While the state’s 1984 Bristol Bay Area Plan 
classified much of the region for wildlife protection, a revised Area Plan in 2005 
removed habitat protections and opened the region for mineral development, setting the 
stage for the beginning of work on the Pebble site the following year (Alaska Department 
of Natural Resources, 2005; Citizens Bristol Bay Area Plan for State Lands, 2013). The 
move underscored the instabilities and dependencies of subsistence-without-land, 
accumulated over time in congressional documents, legal rulings, and in the desk drawers 
of land use planners in Juneau and in Washington, DC. 
Land Management and Sovereignty Today 
Throughout the contiguous Western states, federal policies to expropriate and 
privatize Native land were spurred partly by growing settlement and the perceived need 
to provide whites with profitable farmland. By the time miners were making their way to 
Alaska, Native policy in the West had already shifted toward assimilation with the 
passage of the Dawes Act in 1887 and the accompanying dissolution of tribal land into 
private parcels. New privatization policies served the dual purpose of opening further 
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land to white settlement and enforcing, via writ of purchase and maps of ownership 
boundaries set out in Washington, DC, specific ideologies of land “improvement” based 
on resource profit on privately owned parcels of land.  
Alaska presented a new kind of human and natural terrain for white settlers. 
Farmers did not follow miners as they had in California, and the perceived need to 
provide farmland to white settlers did not drive settlement in Alaska. Indeed, white 
settlement in Alaska was too sparse – and the land, perhaps, too vast – to make federal 
action on Native land claims an immediate priority, but federal policies around Native 
Alaskan land claims nonetheless arguably relied on similar assimilation logics as the 
contiguous states. Where the continental US had treated assimilation policies as 
secondary to militarized violence, some argue that Euro-American settlement in Alaska 
used assimilation policies as its primary means of social control. Evon Peter (2008), 
former executive director of the activist collective Native Movement and former Chief of 
the Neets’aii Gwich’in from Arctic Village in Northeastern Alaska, writes: 
The U.S. had tried massacres, treaties, and reservations in the continental 
United States and those methods either didn’t work well or were 
politically unacceptable. So in Alaska, the U.S. worked hard to assimilate 
Alaska Natives; attempting to both legislatively and educationally 
convince us that we do not have the rights of sovereign peoples and 
nations. 
Today, nearly twenty percent of the land allocated to the state of Alaska and ten 
percent of Native Alaskan land remain unclaimed. Alaskan land management remains a 
complex and contested process, with multiple agencies and multiple stakeholders 
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competing for prominence. Any single land management question might involve such 
diverse federal departments as the National Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
Forest Service, and the Bureau of Land Management, as well as the State of Alaska’s 
Department of Natural Resources. What agencies do with land, and the range of activities 
they regulate – from mining, logging, and wildlife management, to land sales – impacts 
and alters the character and distribution of available resources. While ANILCA was 
established in part to facilitate coordination among the different land management 
agencies, Alaskan land management remains a complex, hotly negotiated patchwork 
(Gallagher, 1987).  
In the following chapters, I will move from this broad overview to the site-
specific debates that have arisen around the proposed Pebble mine in Bristol Bay and the 
Donlin mine off of Crooked Creek in the Yukon-Kuskokwim region of southwest Alaska. 
While the villages along the Kuskokwim River or in the Bristol Bay area may seem far 
removed from Washington DC or from the ideologies of 19th century American 
expansionists, the knowledge, power, and development debates surrounding Pebble and 
Donlin nevertheless hold reflections of these wider epistemic and ideological issues. US 
influence in Alaska is a relatively recent historical phenomenon; the presence of large-
scale development initiatives, state regulatory officials, or corporate agents in rural 
Alaska is more recent still. 
We move first in chapter three to Bristol Bay, and to a series of conversations that 
arose following a set of controversial land use planning changes in 2005. These debates 
culminated in a unique local land planning movement that worked at the boundary 
between state planning and traditional ecological knowledge practices, and that drew 
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together a unique coalition of multiple resource users and practitioners of multiple forms 
of knowledge and ways of relating to the land. Less publicized than – and prior to – the 
international movement that arose to protect Bristol Bay fisheries, the local land planning 
initiatives in the region are an excellent example of the possibilities for creative 
engagement with land planning and environmental impact assessment outside of the 
channels prescribed by state assessment processes. 
Chapter four moves north and west to the Yukon-Kuskokwim delta. Lacking the 
material support and global resonance of a large commercial fishery, and faced with 
much stronger local division, activists and community members in Donlin area instead 
had to channel their work through the existing state and federal pathways for public 
engagement. This was not due to some misdirection on the part of Donlin Gold, nor to 
unpreparedness on the part of the community. Rather, the Donlin case is one that holds 
multiple layers of complexity beyond the “fishing vs. mining (vs. subsistence)” discourse 
that dominated in Bristol Bay. Still, the Donlin case fits within certain narratives that link 
it to the goings-on in the Pebble area: In short, community members along the 
Kuskokwim River drew upon a set of knowledge practices that strategically linked 
technical expertise with traditional ecological knowledge through a heterogeneous 
coalition of community members, activists, and outside experts and consultants. That 
knowledge, however, was necessarily directed to fit within the public engagement 
processes set out by the state and federal permitting agencies.  
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CHAPTER 3: PEBBLE 
The Bristol Bay region in southwest Alaska is the southernmost finger of the 
ancient sedimentary Kahiltna basin, formed when the oceanic Pacific Plate collided with 
the North American plate 90 million years ago. The geologic details of the basin’s 
southern tongue remained relatively insignificant until 1986, when Cominco Alaska, 
studying color anomalies in the terrain from specially fitted aircraft, uncovered evidence 
of a significant mineral deposit at the Pebble site. Today, the Pebble deposit, located deep 
beneath the basin’s surface, has brought the Bristol Bay region to the center of one of the 
most widely recognizable debates over natural resource exploration and development in 
the North.  
 
Figure 1: Trout Unlimited map of the Pebble mine footprint, Bristol Bay region. 
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Canadian mining company Cominco, later absorbed by Teck Resources, Inc., 
filed its initial claim with the State of Alaska in 1988. Exploration continued in the region 
each summer until 1993, at which point the calculated resource deposit included 3 million 
metric tons of copper and 11 million ounces of gold contained within one billion metric 
tons of ore – a significant but not world-class find. Cominco’s initial explorations went 
relatively unnoticed until 2001, when Northern Dynasty Minerals Ltd. (NDML) optioned 
the claim and expanded exploration activity, resulting in the discovery of the larger and 
deeper Pebble East deposit in 2005. By the time the “Pebble Partnership” submitted its 
initial permit applications to the state in 2006, estimates of Pebble’s mineral potential had 
ballooned to 107 million ounces of gold, 36 million metric tons of copper and 2.5 million 
metric tons of molybdenum, one of the largest copper and gold deposits in the world. 
Early designs of the mine site showed that the complex would span 20 square 
miles of state land in the Bristol Bay watershed. The excavation would rank as the largest 
open pit mine in the country, while still relying on additional underground block caving 
to access deeper, higher-grade minerals. It would be a massive industrial undertaking – 
one that would entail clearing large areas of land for supporting infrastructure such as 
new fossil fuel power plants, ports, and containment ponds. Pebble would also require the 
construction of a 104-mile restricted access industrial road and an adjacent pipeline 
corridor to reach ports at the Cook Inlet, fifty miles of which would pass through Bristol 
Bay Native Corporation territory.  
The Pebble deposit is tightly nestled between the ecologically rich and socially 
significant headwaters of the Kvichak and Nushagak Rivers, two of the eight major rivers 
that feed Bristol Bay (see Figure 1). The deposit area is a flatland dotted with glacial 
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ponds and salmon spawning streams, interspersed with ranges of hills rising one to two 
thousand feet high. Every summer some 30 to 40 million adult sockeye salmon return to 
the bay and swim upstream for renewal; they form the backbone of Bristol Bay’s world-
renowned, century-old salmon industry, which is responsible for almost half of the wild 
sockeye salmon yield worldwide and represents the major economic driver in southwest 
Alaska.  
Only this thriving commercial salmon industry could match the scale of the 
proposed Pebble mine. The fishing industry has been the largest job supplier in Alaska 
for years: Bristol Bay fishing alone accounts for the equivalent of 10,000 full-time jobs 
spread across Alaska and the Western US, and makes up nearly 75 percent of local 
employment (Aspelund, 2013). Fisheries generate $500 million a year in direct income 
while creating $1.5 billion in total value across the country (ibid). And the impact of 
Bristol Bay fisheries is not isolated to the Bristol Bay region. Nearly one-third of Bristol 
Bay fishers, and two-thirds of fish processing workers, live in Washington, Oregon, and 
California, while nearly all the Bristol Bay seafood companies and much of the fishing 
fleet active in Bristol Bay are based in Seattle. 7 The seafood extraction and processing 
network thus stretches far beyond the Bay’s boundaries. These direct economic ties may 
partly explain the broad support enjoyed by Pebble’s opponents. 
Salmon communities are diverse and genetically isolated due to their specific 
reproductive cycle, in which adult salmon return to the freshwater, upstream spawning 
ground of their birth and spawn just once before dying. Bristol Bay salmon are thus 
																																																								
7 In 2010, 4,369 of the 11,921 total jobs associated with the Bristol Bay fishing industry were located in 
Alaska. See The Economic Importance of the Bristol Bay Salmon Industry, 2013. 
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considered an especially resilient and sustainable resource, even in the face of global 
climate change, as some fish populations fare better under cooler conditions and some 
produce more fish during warmer climates (Pebble Science, 2011). Beside salmon, the 
region also hosts a full array of Arctic wildlife, fish and birds – over 260 species, 
according to EPA statistics (2014). Indeed, when Cominco held ownership of the claim, 
they considered the region too environmentally sensitive to develop. A resident of one of 
the several dozen Bristol Bay Native communities explains: “we never heard about what 
the plans that they had were… Cominco Teck thought it was located in the wrong place, 
with too much water and habitat. So they pulled back on it, and finally sold their interest 
to Northern Dynasty” (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014). 
The Pebble discovery, and the infrastructure prospects that it implied, afforded 
new extractive significance to the flatlands north of Bristol Bay. But the region is neither 
undeveloped nor uninhabited. Bristol Bay is home to 31 Yup’ik, Dena’ina, and Alutiq 
communities whose life on and use of the land long predate the region’s commercial 
industries. Bristol Bay Native relationships to the land and sea are in part mediated by a 
strong culture of subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering, and community members 
draw from over 150 species of wild plants and animals for subsistence activities. The 
mine, to them, represents a threat to lives, livelihoods, and cultures that are intimately 
linked to Bristol Bay’s ecological well being. The late Bobby Andrew, an elder, 
subsistence hunter, and fisher from Dillingham, and a leading voice of the association of 
eight Alaska Native village corporations in Bristol Bay known as Nunamta Aulukestai 
(Caretakers of the Land), remarks: “Fighting for the future of our renewable fish and 
wildlife resources is a central part of our culture” (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014). 
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Understanding the construction of land and resources in Bristol Bay depends, in 
part, on modeling this interplay of land use, power, and knowledge debates between 
Bristol Bay’s two dominant resource industries: commercial salmon fishing, which 
provides economic value to the state, and sub-surface mining, which is valued primarily 
for its revenue potential. However, these dominant resource industries are joined by a 
longstanding subsistence culture practiced by Bristol Bay Native communities, which 
exists alongside and apart from the ways of knowing and valuing land within the 
commercial salmon industry and the region’s undeveloped mineral wealth. 
The Pebble controversy is a story that takes place in a hybrid world, where visions 
of the land as a site of extraction and profit are in continual conversation with other 
approaches to land and traditional knowledge. While mineral extraction is not new to 
Alaska’s resource landscapes or to state economic logics, the possibility of profitable 
mineral operations in Bristol Bay does represent a shift in on-the-ground land use 
calculations as well as new orientations to land and the self. These ontological changes to 
the Bristol Bay human and natural environment are compounded by the trajectories of 
risks to health and livelihood that mineral extraction poses. In short, contamination at 
Pebble could enter into the body by way of salmon and other subsistence resources, 
shifting people’s relationships to land and self from one of mutual sustenance to one of 
unknown, unseen danger.  
The ongoing debates surrounding the proposed mine, especially during its most 
publicly visible years between the announcement of the site development plan in 2006 
and a preemptive but ultimately temporary veto by the EPA in 2014, were in many ways 
a venue to determine what forms of land use, knowledge, and valuation could be 
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considered as legitimate bases for environmental and developmental decision-making in 
the region. By the 2014 EPA decision, it would become clear that anti-mining coalitions, 
drawing upon a diverse and geographically broad base of support, had the potential to 
challenge the primacy of Alaska’s extractive resource cultures through venues outside of 
the official public engagement processes set out under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) and the State of Alaska’s large mine permitting process. The dominance of 
extractive resource cultures is not what makes the Pebble case unique, therefore, as 
extraction and profit hold power throughout the world. Rather, Pebble matters in how 
land activists and commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishers challenged the 
dominance of mineral extraction, and in how indigenous subsistence-based land 
imaginaries and knowledge systems found purchase within the state regulatory apparatus 
through a hybrid approach to science and traditional knowledge production – and, in the 
case of the 2014 EPA decision, through the strategic application of section 404(c) of the 
Clean Water Act.  
Pebble’s material and symbolic power came to be possible precisely because of 
Alaska’s complex history of imaginative frameworks, settlement patterns, and land use 
policy, driven by specific visions of resource wealth and enacted through the land use and 
management policies described in the preceding chapter. But how did the gold and 
copper of the Pebble deposit, in particular, emerge as emblematic in the early 2000s 
rather than upon Pebble’s initial mapping in the 1980s? And how did Pebble interact with 
land discourses centered on commercial and subsistence fishing? In the sections below, I 
trace the making and remaking of land discourses and imaginaries in Bristol Bay through 
the land use and knowledge construction conflicts surrounding the Pebble permitting 
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process. In particular, I look to the modes of valuation imposed by the State of Alaska 
and the Pebble Partnership to exercise authority over the material terms at play in the 
Pebble debate, as well as the alternate approaches promoted by communities in the 
Bristol Bay region.  
Extractive Land and Resource Imaginaries 
To understand how extractive approaches to land and value gained resonance in 
Bristol Bay it is necessary to look backward, four years before the 1988 discovery of 
Pebble West, to the State of Alaska’s first Bristol Bay Area Plan in 1984. The Bristol Bay 
Area Plan was designed to “[determine] management intent, land and resource use 
designations, and management guidelines that apply to all state lands in the planning 
area” (Alaska Department of Natural Resources, 2005, p1-1). This original planning 
document acknowledged the importance of the region for diverse habitats, and the state 
co-classified the majority of Bristol Bay land as “habitat and public recreation” or habitat 
and mineral development.” When the first Pebble deposit was identified in 1986 it 
became clear that the 1984 habitat protections would present a roadblock to development. 
The acceleration of development at the Pebble site in the early 2000s thus coincided with 
the end of the 1984 plan’s 20-year shelf life. The new Area Plan, completed in April 
2005, redrew the boundaries of vast swaths of Bristol Bay lands, opening them to mineral 
use and setting the stage for the Pebble permitting process to begin. The 2005 Plan 
declared mining and mineral exploration as the only designated use on 9.4 million acres 
of the Bristol Bay drainage area, which amounts to nearly 80% of state-owned land in the 
region, while also restricting the protection of inland habitats. The diverse use of the 
habitat and practices on the land such as subsistence and recreation were, in this way, 
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moved to the background, to make room for mineral exploration and extraction. The 
management priorities that were encoded in the 2005 plan suggest that, by the time 
Pebble entered into public awareness in the early 2000s, the set of Bristol Bay land use 
possibilities that were legible to the state had shifted to favor extractive land use and 
mineral profit. Attorney Geoffrey Parker, who represented the Bristol Bay tribes opposed 
to the Pebble mine, comments: 
By 2004, people realized that in order to develop Pebble we have to peel off the 
habitat classification, and have to peel off the public recreation classification, and 
solely leave minerals as it trumps everything else. (interview with Bindu 
Panikkar, 2014) 
At the same time as the state reordered land use priorities in Bristol Bay, Alaskan 
politicians and regulators, with the support of the mining industry, simultaneously 
worked to extend state control over the large mine permitting and environmental 
assessment process itself. In Alaska, the (NEPA) process – which sets out federal 
standards for environmental protection and impact assessment – is often seen as “federal 
overreach,” and as Pebble neared the permitting stage, the state worked to further 
consolidate its NEPA authority. These policies, discussed below, also sought to solidify 
the state’s ability to script how resources are used and imagined in Bristol Bay.  
In 2013, the Alaska legislature passed Senate Bill 27, giving the Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) and Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) primacy over project permitting. State primacy effectively limits 
federal activity and enables “one-stop permitting” unless the project is sited on federal 
lands. Michelle Bonnet, Director of Alaska’s Department of Conservation, claims that 
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state primacy functions to “balance its citizens needs with their use of lands and water 
resources—and, consequently, to maintain productive natural resources while considering 
industrial growth and development, while providing the protections provided by the 
Clean Water Act” (Hale and Ross, 2013, p. 7). In a state that is highly dependent on and 
supportive of resource extraction, moves to centralize the permitting process have 
contributed to community concerns that Pebble would be assured an easy stamp of 
approval were it to enter the permitting stage. 
House Bill 77, introduced to the state legislature by Alaska governor Sean Parnell 
in 2013, attempted to further solidify state control over natural resource decisions through 
several avenues. HB77 would have limited public participation in land use decision 
making by restricting public comment on the issuance of water and general land permits, 
as well as by limiting the public’s capability to make appeals to the agency or to the court 
unless the party had a financial or real estate interest in the affected area. HB77 also 
granted unlimited extensions of temporary water use permits, as well as indefinite 
approval for water appropriation without the requirement to assess potential harm to fish 
or habitat. Pam Miller, of Alaska Community Action on Toxics, notes: 
If the public becomes too unruly, too effective at limiting whatever development 
or project that the industry would like to move forward with, then the state, 
simply on industry’s behalf, shuts out the public. Whether that's limiting public 
participation in decisions about permits or limiting our rights to do public 
litigation, citizen suits; making those things more impossible; and making them 
more risky because of the fee structures… I think that's what the state has really 
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been after. The effect is to shut the public out of decisions. (interview with Bindu 
Pankkar, 2014) 
 Tribal governments and other entities actively opposed the bill. HB77 became a 
central issue during the Pebble campaign, and the legislature received more than 1,500 
letters, resolutions, petitions, and other documents in opposition. Some of Pebble’s 
opponents dubbed it “The Silencing Alaskans Act;” community conservation organization 
Cook Inletkeeper called HB77 “a gift bag full of fish and game habitat rollbacks for large 
mining corporations” (Cook Inletkeeper, 2013). The bill passed Alaska’s House of 
Representatives in 2014 but failed to make it through the state senate. For some activists, 
the HB77 controversy underscored the importance of open public process. Water rights 
lawyer Hal Shepard (2014) commented: 
…because HB77 was merely tabled, this does not mean that it is entirely dead – 
there’s always next session and more bills. Alaskans must, therefore, remain 
vigilant and ensure that any future efforts to change the use of the state's water 
and other natural resources is conducted using a transparent public process, and 
includes a consultation process with tribes when the proposed changes are 
significant in scope or would affect subsistence uses and tribal interests.  
The construction of land as an extractive and profitable space is not an isolated 
process. Meaning and value, as they are applied to particular resources, come to be 
defined in conversation with other relevant resource discourses in the region. Oil 
dominates Alaskan economics and identity, and it is impossible to consider the 
significance of gold or copper without placing them in the context of Alaska’s 
contemporary oil economy. Despite the historical importance of the mining industry as a 
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driver of Alaskan settlement, the Alaskan economy has been driven by oil – “black gold,” 
rather than yellow – since the discovery of vast reserves on the North Slope and the 1977 
completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Off the southern end of Bristol Bay, the 
North Aleutians Basin has also been home to extensive oil prospecting, though a series of 
offshore drilling moratoriums has thus far protected the ecologically productive basin 
region from oil development. But Alaska today is a fading oil empire. Annual crude oil 
production has fallen by more than two-thirds since its peak in 1988 (USEIA, 2014). In 
addition, recent years have seen a decline in oil prices, and the state estimates that direct 
employment in oil and gas industries will fall ten percent by 2024. Employment in 
mining-related fields, by contrast, is expected to rise by just over five percent. 
The Pebble Partnership has promoted mine development in the context of 
Alaska’s oil challenges, and situates itself as a multi-metal mine with prospects beyond 
copper, including molybdenum, used in gun barrels as an alloy; rhenium, used in high 
performance jet fighters; and selenium and tellurium, used in technologies such as wind 
turbines, hybrid cars, and solar power (Pebble Limited Partnership, 2011; McGroarty, 
2013). In Alaska, control over resources is additionally linked to state independence from 
“federal overreach.” In the words of the Pebble partnership, on their webpage Why Mine, 
“[the] less our country relies on outside sources of energy, the more control we have for 
our destiny” (Pebble Limited Partnership, 2017). These ideations of value form the core 
arguments surrounding Pebble’s symbolic power and the decisions made by the state as 
to how resources gain power and standing. As we will see, however, the Pebble 
Partnership’s work to frame the mine’s resource potential as a friendly complement to 
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sustainable economies and as a boon to state coffers is not uncontested when 
counterpointed to Bristol Bay’s existing commercial industries. 
Science, Knowledge Production, and Land Planning in Bristol Bay 
The Pebble case is unique in that extractive mineral development, despite its 
longevity and rootedness in Alaska’s material history, found itself up against a set 
material imaginaries that had rooting in lived experience – through the work of 
commercial fishers from Alaska and as far away as Seattle and elsewhere, and the 
subsistence culture of indigenous residents – with a strong foothold in state resource 
economies. The same factors that explain the powerful resonance of Bristol Bay salmon, 
however, also condition Bristol Bay commercial fishing as an extractive industry. That 
the majority of salmon processing takes place in Seattle, and the majority of Bristol Bay 
salmon profit flows to Seattle-based companies, mark Bristol Bay as an extractive 
resource colony, whether its primary resource value lies in salmon or in copper. And 
commercial and subsistence fishers did not always see eye to eye. It was only the specter 
of the Pebble mine that provided the basis to unite disparate fishing communities that, 
until Pebble’s emergence, had often found themselves in contention. Indeed, according to 
Tim Troll, “the influx of sport fishermen, the rise of lodges, and the fear of intense use” 
were the most immediate concerns of local people prior to the emergence of the mineral 
prospects at the Pebble site (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014). At that time, the most 
immediate land use conflict revolved around the purchase, by a non-native Alaskan, of 
160 acres from native allotments in a location along the river. The new owner subdivided 
the parcel into eighty two-acre lots to sell for recreational use, drawing opposition from 
Native residents who were concerned with possible impacts on the river ecosystem, 
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resource access, and how the purchase would shrink Native land allotments. It was then 
that Northern Dynasty announced the discovery of the Pebble East Deposit in 2006, 
spurring the emergence of a strong alliance, albeit a potentially temporary one, between 
the very users of salmon resources that had until then represented the region’s most 
immediately felt land use conflict.  
Alaska’s land use regimes, as we have seen, have historically functioned as a 
mechanism to remove Native communities from their territory while, at the same time, 
enforcing a single acceptable definition of the relationship between people and the land. 
We have also seen the historical ties between land expropriation and the exploitation of 
natural resources. Native activists in Bristol Bay thus navigate a complex boundary 
between repudiation and acknowledgement: challenging colonial definitions of land-as-
profit, while simultaneously asserting arguments that oppose the mine on grounds legible 
to existing regulatory structures. In Earthworks executive director Jennifer Krill’s words, 
this means “win[ning] the debate on mining company terms” (interview with Bindu 
Panikkar, 2014). The strategic alliance between commercial and subsistence fishing 
helped grow material and numerical support for the anti-Pebble campaign and opened 
doors for Bristol Bay activists in state and federal offices. 
Land use policy is not always a highly visible arena for environmental activism. 
The September 2014 Peoples’ Climate March, which drew over 300,000 to the streets of 
New York City, might be said to represent the most recognizable public face of US 
environmental activism in recent memory. But the Pebble permitting conflict was not 
characterized by protest on that scale. Nor has it yet been marked by organized direct 
action, as at the ongoing Unist’ot’en First Nations encampment and pipeline blockade off 
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of Alaska’s southeastern border with Canada. Contestations over the Pebble mine have 
instead played out largely in esoteric and expert realms – with coalitional positioning and 
technical documents as their primary language. Coalitions of local activists and expert 
consultants approach the Pebble question from three angles: challenging the science 
coming out of state and industry offices; promoting local knowledge, alongside science, 
as a legitimate and meaningful approach to understanding the land and making land use 
decisions; and engaging in locally-rooted land use planning processes in order to 
articulate community-led land use, knowledge, and decision-making practices to the state 
and outside observers. 
Community Oriented Science 
Mediating questions of the viability of mineral resource development in Bristol 
Bay required a metric and a method that could be identified as an objective reading of 
natural realities. Western scientific methods and science-producing organizations have 
historically taken on the role of producing official knowledge, with consequences for the 
power and resonance of indigenous knowledge systems at the colonial frontier. “Science 
and technology do not merely change how we live our lives,” writes Epstein. “They also 
lend power to those who speak in their name, and they offer new tools for establishing 
what counts as credible or true” (2008, p. 177). In Bristol Bay, scientific data collection 
can be thought of as a specific set of performed practices, integrating multiple 
individuals, institutions, and ideologies in order to produce a coherent reading of the 
landscape that fits within the narrow bounds of EIS requirements and scientific best 
practices.  
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The campaign opposing Pebble relied, in part, on the work of a team of scientists 
and experts to assess Pebble’s environmental and risk data, as well as to identify and fill a 
number of significant gaps in Pebble’s data. Frickel et al (2010) draw upon the term 
“undone science” to refer to areas of research that are systematically left incomplete, 
often with consequences for public understanding of risk and impact. In Bristol Bay, 
expert consultants attempted to “do” the science that Pebble and the state had left 
“undone” – and, in so doing, to independently verify or contest the readings of the land 
implied in state and industry data. In this vein, salmon conservation work coalesced 
around a particular state land management procedure, the Anadromous Waters Catalog, 
which tracks waterways important to the “spawning, rearing, or migration” of 
anadromous fish and that specifies which bodies of water are afforded protection under 
AS 16.05.871 (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2017). Waters listed in the Catalog 
require additional assurances that development will not harm fish populations; 
conversely, waters that are not included in the Catalog are assumed to not play host to 
anadromous fish. Salmon protection in Bristol Bay thus required a deliberate exercise to 
document anadromous streams for inclusion in the Catalog and for protection under AS 
16.05.871. According to Troll: 
If there’s a model that predicts there’s salmon here...it creates at least a 
presumption that they are there, and the presumption should be in favor of the 
fish. It’s a rebuttable presumption… [That] doesn’t mean that a mining company 
can’t come in and take more than is reserved for salmon, but it does elevate the 
notice process, it does elevate the adjudication process to a level where the public 
is aware of it. (interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
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Carol Ann Woody has come to be a central figure in Bristol Bay’s community 
science network. Woody came to Bristol Bay first with the US Geological Survey, and 
later again with the National Parks Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service. A report 
Woody co-authored with Sarah Louise O’Neal (2012) showed that even small amounts of 
copper are toxic to fish, impacting their sense of smell and the navigating capability of 
salmon to return to their spawning grounds (McIntyre et al., 2012; Scannell, 2009). She 
explains why there is an abundance of salmon spawning streams and habitat in the 
region:  
Bristol Bay is a great habitat for [salmon]. But the whole region, the glaciers left 
this really porous rock, and there's lots and lots of ground water. And the ground 
water is the key factor here. Because we get winters that go to 40 below for 
extended periods, and you got teeny little eggs that are this big in the ground, 
they’re only buried about this deep, 10 cm, 20 cm deep, and if you freeze the dam 
there they die. But the ground water never freezes; it usually is a constant warm 
temperature 2 to 4 degrees. There's ground water everywhere there and that's what 
feeds a lot of those systems, it goes through the porous gravel and it keeps a lot of 
these little eggs alive and sustains them. It also provides a preliminary habitat for 
fish, because fish will borough down in the gravel and hang out there. (interview 
with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
Pebble proponents, however, contend that the science is not conclusive, and that 
natural fluctuation in copper levels is of greater significance. “The science is basically 
where they've taken fish in a lab situation and just added [copper], and does not replicate 
nature. The copper uptake is very different in nature than in a controlled lab environment. 
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And the irony is that salmon need copper in order to survive. We all do” (PLP official, 
interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014). 
The Center for Science in Public Participation (CSP2) was another key site for 
science and knowledge production in conversation with community needs. CSP2 studied 
water issues, (2011a), impacts associated with Pebble’s exploration phases (Zamzow, 
2010), acid rock drainage and metal leaching (Zamzow, 2011b, c), and the seismic risk at 
the Pebble mine (Higman, 2008). Their work was conducted outside of the response to 
PLP’s baseline data. Most recently, Dave Chambers at CSP2 has demonstrated 
significant ongoing contamination, improper closure procedures, and insufficient 
reclamation work at Pebble’s decommissioned exploratory drill sites. Of the 107 sites 
they tested, two out of three had experienced environmental contamination (Zamzow and 
Chambers, 2016).   
Promoting Local Knowledge 
The joint work of outside experts alongside local activists was structured under a 
series of documents that brought together expert consultants, environmental nonprofits, 
and Bristol Bay activists and residents. In 2004, before Pebble gained notoriety, Bristol 
Bay Heritage Land Trust executive director Tim Troll, along with the Nature 
Conservancy and the Bristol Bay Native Association, developed the Nushagak River 
Traditional Use Area Conservation Plan based on the traditional knowledge and 
subsistence practices of Yup’ik residents. As part of this project, Troll visited five 
villages in the region – Koliganek, New Stuyahok, Ekwok, Aleknagik, and Dillingham – 
and sat with community members to document place names, hunting and fishing 
locations, and streams where salmon and other species of fish are abundant. After Pebble 
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announced its western deposit, Troll and the Nature Conservancy expanded on the project 
to include an ecological risk assessment of open pit mining in the Nushagak-Mulchatna 
watershed (Ecology and Environment Inc., 2010) and the Standards and Practices for 
Environmentally Responsible Mining in the Nushagak River Watershed, a position 
statement based on the findings of the 2010 risk assessment (Nushagak-Mulchatna 
Watershed Council, 2011). Both documents in turn drew on the 2007 traditional use plan 
(Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council, 2007). To Troll, the goal of the 2010 report 
was “to articulate, for those coming into the region, what informed consent and prior 
notice look like.”  
The four alternative planning documents work to reorient and decentralize 
knowledge construction as it is applied to land use planning at the moments of question-
definition, data collection, and policy recommendation. State land planning starts 
centrally, and the process of question-definition might settle itself entirely in Washington, 
DC and in Juneau, where, for instance, lawmakers and planners might negotiate the 
overarching purpose that state-held lands are designed to serve, insulating communities 
from the decisions that impact their land, culture, and lifestyle.8,9 Only once the scientists 
or planners are prepared to execute their plan, study, or proposal might they go into “the 
field,” where communities are often taken as a subject of research or policy rather than as 
																																																								
8 See Callon (2011) on the delegation of knowledge production to scientific elites and experts. 
9 In 1959, for instance, as the state of Alaska was poised to select its allotted federal acreage, state land 
selection was congressionally mandated as “for the purposes of furthering the development of and 
expansion of communities” – not for conservation or the protection of indigenous land use. See An Act to 
Provide for the Admission of the State of Alaska in the Union, Public Law 88-508, US Statutes at Large 72 
(1958): 339-352. 
	 54	
produces or holders of knowledge in their own right.10 Activists working on the 2007 
Conservation Plan upended the stage of question-definition, however, by bringing it to 
the “field” where the effects of the Plan would be felt, and asking community members to 
define places, resources, and practices they found important. This is significant in that as 
its primary and foundational data the Conservation Plan relied not on the analyses of 
outside experts but on the knowledge of Bristol Bay elders as related in a series of 
interviews. Troll describes: 
So we spent anywhere from 2-3 days in a village with people designated 
from the community. We sat around with maps, we asked for place names, 
where they hunted, where they fished, what places they thought were 
important, where they knew salmon were, different varieties of fish.  So 
we just wanted to capture that baseline. So it’s that baseline. But we also 
had other data sources, so we wanted to develop: One, a good idea of what 
resources were out there – intuitively we knew, but, what places the 
people considered important. But our primary focus was on lands that 
were owned by the Native corporations created under the settlement act. 
So that they could be thinking about how do incorporate habitat 
management or protection into our land management plans in the future. 
(interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
																																																								
10 Mosse (2005) argues that the networks of policymakers, development experts, and on-the-ground NGO 
officials and employees that execute local development projects have a tendency to shift project goals in 
order to match outcomes. In participatory or community-directed projects, this often means that when 
communities don’t “cooperate” – that is, when local needs or the processes by which community members 
make and carry out decisions don’t match the expectations of the network of project executors – experts 
and employees can shift away from the participatory process even when that process was central to the 
initial design of the project. 
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These reorientations in knowledge production, decision-making, and value come 
together to present an interpretation of indigenous modes of relating to the land, visible in 
the Conservation Plan document as particular image of indigenous life in Alaska focused 
on practices of subsistence and framed within a notion of connectedness to the land and 
natural world. These representations are most clearly visible on page nine of the 
Conservation Plan, “The Subsistence Way of Life – Yup’ik Culture,” where land and 
human practice appear inseparable: 
Although methods have changed, the Yup’ik residents of the region today, 
like their ancestors, still rely on the bounty of the watershed. Moose, 
caribou, salmon, geese, berries, and plants are the principal resources that 
fill smoke houses, drying racks, freezers, and canning jars. Hunting, 
fishing, and gathering are a vital part of the local way of life. To lose these 
resources would not only jeopardize the health of people in the watershed, 
but their culture as well. 
The text is followed by a series of images of fishing and fish preparation, where 
contemporary and historical technologies and methods are interspersed and visually 
linked. The document applies this same interspersing throughout, with a clear message of 
connectedness-across-time. This is not to claim something unchanging, for changes in 
technology and practice are also clearly visible in images that accompany the text; rather, 
the document appears to mobilize a certain presentation of indigenous life in which 
subsistence fishing has long allowed for a certain set of cultural and environmental 
relationships that are themselves valuable – and that would be jeopardized by the 
construction of the Pebble mine.  
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The Conservation Plan also draws upon a notion of continuance that directly 
confronts attempts to write indigenous life out of contemporary history. By drawing 
connections to practices and, therefore, to the onto-epistemological approaches of Bristol 
Bay indigenous communities across time, the Conservation Plan confirms, clearly, that 
practices indigenous to the region and people remain relevant, practical, and widespread. 
That continued existence, meanwhile, was, and is, predicated on land-based relationships; 
in this way, threats to subsistence would not only threaten the livelihood of Bristol Bay 
Natives, but would disrupt a core part of indigenous identification in the region. This is 
made clear from the third page of the Conservation Plan document, before, even, the 
table of contents. Beneath a full-page portrait is a quotation attributed to Harvey 
Samuelson at the Bristol Bay Village Leadership Conference in 2001: “Land is the gift of 
our ancestors and the guarantee of our right to continue our subsistence lifestyle. Land is 
the heart of our culture. Without the land, we are nothing.” 
If Western scientific ontologies were successful in separating the social from the 
natural in the metropole, they were unable to entirely enforce that separation in Bristol 
Bay. And these contestations long predate the Pebble debate. As far back as its inception 
in the 1980s, the Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council has been at the center of a set 
of conversations at the intersection of land use, land title, and tribal sovereignty. Bobby 
Andrew remembers some of the early debates over the environmental and social impact 
of transferring Native land allotments to private, non-Native hands:  
The villages corporations were created in 1971 and that delineated the native 
allotment application process. Many of the lands on the Nushagak River, the 
Wood River, the Lake Aleknagik, the Manokotak, Togiak areas. Many of the 
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native people prior to the passage of ANCSA [Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act] applied for native allotments. And currently today many of those native 
allotments are being sold, and when they’re sold they become private properties, 
and they build lodges on those and they’re located right on sensitive habitat areas. 
(interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
But what is discursively difficult may be accomplished materially. As Samuelson 
makes clear, the Pebble mine may impose what, so far, scientific, government, and 
industry circles have been unable to entirely enforce: the remaking of local, specific land 
use practices and relationships to land along lines of private property and private profit.  
Local planners do not present subsistence in complete opposition to notions of 
nature-as-resource. Rather, just as Bristol Bay activists were able to strategically ally 
subsistence fishing with commercial fishing, the Conservation Plan also draws upon 
resource discourses alongside descriptions of traditional and contemporary subsistence. It 
consistently refers to “What’s at Stake” as “natural resources,” as subsistence, and, at 
times, as “natural resource related activities.” At the same time as they “contribute to the 
local economy,” however, natural resources and the subsistence activities surrounding 
them “support the traditional lifestyle.” Subsistence is presented, in part, as a form of 
economic activity, albeit economic activity that is particular to indigenous culture, 
through a careful blend of arguments that may seem, on their surface, to be mutually 
incompatible.  
It is important to not lose sight of the structural realities that condition and 
necessitate these careful navigations of hybrid discourses. If we momentarily flip the 
angle of our analysis – and look to the state, instead of the activist – the process of 
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building knowledge and arguments that are legible to central state planners becomes 
more complex and more historically central. Indeed, moves to legibility emerged not just 
as a requirement levied upon particular local activists, but as a broad program that was 
central to the construction of the modern state. From the development of forest ledgers to 
the modern street grid, modernity carried with it a series of state administrative practices 
that aimed to render state subjects clearly legible and, in turn, rationally manageable and 
easily governable (Scott, 1998). Knowledge, then, to the modern state, can be thought of 
as a commodity, built out of the collection of individual pieces of data and information. 
Measurement instruments extract data from the land, and return it to centers of 
knowledge and power; academic, scientific, or governmental organizations then assemble 
data into actionable policies, which in turn are transmitted back to the regions from which 
data were extracted. In this interpretation, information functions almost as a raw material, 
analogous to sugar or cotton, which is removed from the peripheries of empire and only 
returned in a form that is fully assembled and fixed in its uses. Where this form of data 
became, over time, the only acceptable language of knowledge-making for land use 
policy decisions, activists have no choice but to frame their arguments on those terms.  
Local Land Planning: The Citizens’ Alternative Bristol Bay Area Plan 
In 2005, Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR) proposed a series of 
land reclassifications in the Bristol Bay region that opened protected land to resource 
extraction. The 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan, a revision to 1984 land use agreements, was 
quickly taken up by local organizers as a serious threat to regional ecosystems and 
subsistence practices. Organizers responded with a lawsuit in 2009, and in 2012, the 
claimants – Nondalton, Koliganek, New Stuyahok, Ekwok, Curyung (Dillingham), and 
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Levelock, together the “Six Tribes,” along with Trout Unlimited and the Alaska 
Independent Fishermen’s Marketing Association – settled with the DNR with an 
agreement to revise the 2005 plan. When the December 2012 revisions proved 
unsatisfactory, however, the Six Tribes initiated an alternative area plan of their own.  
The Citizens Alternative Bristol Bay Area Plan (CABBAP), initially drafted by 
Parker, Troll, and Emily Anderson of the Wild Salmon Center, with input from the six 
tribes and several environmental groups, effectively integrated the work of the Nushagak-
Mulchatna Watershed Council alongside multiple scientific studies to form a 
comprehensive land planning document that forefronted subsistence and local use 
practices. CABBAP, though consistent with the state, federal, local and tribal efforts to 
balance conservation and development, asserts the importance of local voices in 
managing natural resources and ways of life in the region. Accordingly, the Alternative 
Area Plan introduced a “subsistence” land use designation, emphasized increased 
protection for habitat and precaution when making land use decisions that significantly 
impact salmon, suggested that all waters in the Bristol Bay region be considered 
anadromous until proven otherwise, and demanded prohibition of metallic sulfide mines 
in Nushagak and Kvichak watersheds. The Alternative Plan expanded habitat 
designations; in contrast, the state definition of habitat and use of resources privileges 
exploitation unless the land is in a critical condition to require such a protection.  
Pebble activists are tasked with a complex exercise in boundary negotiation to 
challenge colonial definitions of land-as-profit while simultaneously working within 
existing economic and regulatory structures. These local, alternative land planning 
documents are a vital part of Alaska’s long history of conflicts over land sovereignty. 
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Bristol Bay’s alternative planning documents, in their capacity to “’challenge the 
state’…by employing ‘the state’s own data,’” draw on a robust hybrid tradition to 
effectively navigate the border between repudiating state control over knowledge 
production and acknowledging its power to impact immediate land decisions (Hebert, 
2017, p. 60),  
The specific practice of community-oriented science in Bristol Bay arguably 
worked to blur the boundaries between Western scientific knowledge and traditional 
land-based knowledge rooted in subsistence practices. Troll’s work on local land use 
plans based in subsistence interviews is perhaps the clearest example. But the practice of 
knowledge production in Bristol Bay contrasts with Pebble science at a more 
fundamental level than just the identity of its practitioners or the sources of its data. They 
differ, crucially, in their respective foundations in practice, experience, and embodiment. 
For science as it is practiced sits at the level of the process and the procedure of 
collecting particular data to assemble a particular story; it is a method and approach to 
knowledge production that can be applied in Bristol Bay in the same manner as in North 
Dakota or Louisiana, and that is strongly tied to the requirements of regulatory and 
permit agencies. Measurement, here, is the central activity, used to understand the various 
biophysical phenomenon of the region – without situating the data within the experienced 
complexity of the land and the people who exist in and alongside it. In contrast, when 
considered in aggregate, the work of local knowledge producers and allies like Troll and 
Zamzow is arguably a practice of relating to the land or territory, first, and the process or 
procedure second. Stronger procedural inclusion of knowledge systems that arise out of 
democratic and citizen based initiatives may hold the promise of building land practices 
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and valuations that are formed out of the hybrid discourses of rural Alaskan life – rather 
than out of the domination of one form of knowledge and land imaginary over another.  
In 2010, based on multiple preliminary environmental assessments, six federally 
recognized tribes in the Kvichak and Nushagak River watersheds, along with the Alaska 
Independent Fisherman’s Marketing Association, delivered a landmark petition to EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson and EPA Region 10 administrator Dennis McLerran to 
protect the Kvichak and Nushagak River Drainages and Bristol Bay from metallic sulfide 
mining under Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act. In effect, the petition sought federal 
intervention prior even to Pebble’s permit decisions – a request that was audacious and 
unprecedented. Parker (2012) explains the objective of such an early prohibition: 
It will eliminate frustrating situations in which someone spends time and money 
developing a project for an inappropriate site and learns at an advanced stage that 
he must start over. In addition, advance prohibition will facilitate comprehensive 
rather than piecemeal protection of wetlands.  
In response to the request from the tribes, the EPA initiated a scientific study 
looking at the potential impacts of large-scale mining on the Bristol Bay region. In 
January 2014, after three years of research, two independent peer reviews, and two 
rounds of public comment, the EPA concluded that a mine like Pebble could result in lost 
salmon habitat and ecosystem degradation. On these grounds, the agency predicted that it 
would not grant the Pebble project it’s Clean Water Act 404(C) authorization. It was a 
landmark decision that halted a major development project before permit applications had 
been submitted. But the EPA process was also unique in its treatment of the hybrid nature 
of life of the Bristol Bay region. In a rare acknowledgement of the complexity of 
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subsistence life, the EPA’s assessment placed special emphasis on the multiple meanings 
– economic and non-economic – of subsistence livelihood and culture, along with hard 
data on subsistence use and volumes (Environmental Protection Agency, 2014):  
In the Bristol Bay region, the subsistence way of life is irreplaceable. Subsistence 
resources provide high-quality foods, foster a healthy lifestyle, and form the basis 
for social relations. Alaska Natives are the majority population in the Bristol Bay 
region, and salmon has been central to their health, welfare, and culture for 
thousands of years.  
  That the 2014 EPA document took subsistence use into consideration was not 
just due to the benevolence of the agency nor some inherent quality of subsistence 
resource use, though both certainly helped. Rather, the resonance of indigenous 
approaches to the land as they appeared in the EPA document was the result of an 
accumulation of material and discursive power, accomplished through the diverse tactics 
of Bristol Bay tribes, citizen scientists, lawyers, and environmental activists to build 
complex hybrid discourses of Western science and indigenous land use, on the one hand, 
and legibility and legitimacy within state-centered planning processes on the other. 
Highlighting the politically motivated nature of permitting, however, Scott Pruitt’s EPA 
has recently reversed the agency’s prior restrictions, allowing Pebble’s permit 
applications to move forward after lengthy legal battle. 
Conclusion: Knowledge and Power at the Borderlands 
“Land use” implies, simultaneously, the ways that people and societies interact 
with the land, how they imagine their relationship to or with the landscape, and how 
knowledge of the land is constructed and legitimated. It is, in a word, the intersection of 
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ontology, epistemology, and the material. And practice and imagination have 
unmistakable consequences. As we trace the development of land use and land 
imaginaries along lines of private ownership and profit, we are reminded of James C. 
Scott’s (1998) warning on the limitations of state-centered planning processes:  
These state simplifications…did not successfully represent the actual 
activity of the society they depicted, nor were they intended to; they 
represented only that slice of it that interested the official observer. They 
were, moreover, not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied 
with state power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be 
remade. 
It took work to contain and marginalize indigenous forms of relating to the land in 
favor of profit-motivated (that is, development-motivated) private property. But, as the 
hybrid contestations surrounding Pebble indicate, the enforcement of epistemic and 
material uniformity inherent to colonialism and extractive capitalism were not so total in 
Alaska. To speak of hybrid discourses is, to a degree, to speak of all discourses – 
especially in temporal-spatial moments that embody colonial contact so clearly as the 
continuing question of Native Alaskan claims to land and sovereignty. If “hybridity is 
intrinsic to colonial discourse,” as Brah and Coombes (2000, p. 11) hold, how can we 
think about the discursive strategies of anti-Pebble activists as anything but a 
consequence of colonized discourse? More broadly, what epistemic consequences are 
embodied in the strategic adoption and application of Western scientific discourses?  
Following the years of interviews and scientific data-collection that went into the 
2007 Conservation Plan and 2010 Risk Assessment, both of which were tailored 
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powerful networks of government, regulators, and industry in different ways, the 
Watershed Council and its Nature Conservancy allies worked to develop a set of 
processes by which development in the region could proceed with the consent of Bristol 
Bay residents. Summarized in the 2011 Framework on Responsible Mining, they are 
demands not of outcome, but of process – a statement of how the activists and residents 
impacted by potential development wish to be approached. This is summed as “free, prior 
and informed consent,” as follows: 
Free – people are able to freely make decisions without coercion, 
intimidation or manipulation;  
Prior – sufficient time is allocated for people to be involved in the 
decision-making process before key project decisions are made and 
impacts occur;  
Informed – people are fully informed about the project and its potential 
impacts and benefits, and the various perspectives regarding the project 
(both positive and negative);  
Consent – there are effective processes for affected indigenous peoples to 
approve or withhold their consent, consistent with their decision-making 
processes, and that their decisions are respected and upheld. 
If the history of the region is any indication, standards of free, prior, informed 
consent are unlikely to enter into Alaska’s large mine permitting process. The authors of 
the 2011 document know this. What the Framework document recognizes, however, is 
that while discourse and meaning are themselves significant, they are toothless without 
their procedural and material counterparts. Indeed, the subtle hybrid reframing that we 
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see in the Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council documents and in the coalitional 
work between outside experts and community members is partly important in the precise 
absence of material, land-based power. Discursive projects can, of course, have material 
effects – but their impact, both as strategy and as object of research, arises out of a set of 
historical conditions in which the capacity to create drastic reframings of the material 
world is limited.  
Free, prior, informed consent implies this shift in material-discursive realities. If 
Pebble activists are any model, and their hybrid work – of appealing to the EPA while 
educating their neighbors, of interspersing scientific with community data, of mobilizing 
environmentalist logic while simultaneously altering it – is any indication, then material-
discursive shifts can be conceived in tandem. If this work at the boundary, in which 
questions of discourse, materiality, and power are inescapable, can produce a reframing 
of multiple discourses and multiple knowledges, then perhaps it is this boundary work, 
too, in which that reframing can be put into operational practice. 
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CHAPTER 4: DONLIN 
The Donlin project is a proposed gold mine located in southwest Alaska, just 
northeast of where the Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers reach their closest point. Estimated 
at 39 million ounces of gold, it is a significant claim – though not historic – and despite 
the fact that exploration has been ongoing for over a decade, exploratory drill sites have 
identified new rich deposits in the region as recently as 2017 (Novagold, 2018). Like 
most other industrial-scale mineral projects today, the Donlin site holds lower grade 
material than the incomparably smaller projects of the early 20th century. Compared to its 
peers, however, Donlin’s estimated 2.24 grams per ton remains a surprisingly rich find, 
especially for the large size of the claim.  
 
Figure 2: Donlin Gold, LLC map of mine site and pipeline alignment. 
Donlin’s plan of operations calls for a large open pit measuring roughly 2.2 miles 
long and one mile across. Solid mine waste would be stored in a second pit, while liquid 
waste would be channeled into a tailings pond constructed by flooding a nearby valley 
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behind a mile-long, 460 foot high dam. Total waste over the 27-year lifetime of the mine 
is estimated to exceed 3 billion tons of rock and tailings (Ground Truth Trekking, 2015). 
Given the relative remoteness of the Yukon-Kuskokwim region, development at Donlin 
would require significant new infrastructure to operate, including the construction of a 
new airstrip, roads, housing, and a barge port on the Kuskokwim River. Additionally, the 
Donlin plan calls for a 315-mile underground natural gas pipeline from the mine site to 
ports on Cook Inlet (see Figure 2). Given the massive volume of waste rock and tailings 
and the potential environmental and health risks posed by Donlin’s substantial 
infrastructure requirements, the proposal has faced strong opposition in the Yukon-
Kuskokwim area and in state offices in Anchorage. That opposition, however, has been 
limited to complex debates over siting questions, development alternatives, and state and 
federal impact assessment and planning process, putting Donlin in stark contrast with the 
widespread and vocal opposition that surrounded the permitting process of the Pebble 
Mine just a few years before.  
The Donlin mine is a significant untold story of the complexities of resource 
development, environmental protection, and Native sovereignty in contemporary Alaska. 
Donlin’s invisibility is due, in part, to the prominence of the Pebble controversy. As 
described in the previous chapter, the early 2000s saw the growth of an international 
movement opposing development at the Pebble site, and a strong coalition of subsistence, 
commercial, and recreational fishers, with the help of independent scientists and 
environmental advocacy organizations, successfully petitioned the EPA to veto the 
Pebble plan under its authority to regulate waste discharge into significant waterways. 
While Pebble has witnessed near-unanimous opposition in Bristol Bay and nationally, the 
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Donlin project has thus far flown under the radar of environmental activists outside 
Alaska while inspiring strong divides between and among communities along the 
Kuskokwim River. Some activists even characterize Pebble’s notoriety as a boon to the 
developers at Donlin, arguing that it was the controversy in Bristol Bay that allowed for 
the Donlin project to proceed with little opposition and a divided constituency. 
Donlin also holds a number of operational similarities to Pebble. Both are planned 
as industrial-scale open pit projects requiring significant infrastructure development, and 
both Donlin and Pebble represent potential contamination threats to the Yukon-
Kuskowim and the Nushagak and Kvichak watersheds, respectively. But Donlin and 
Pebble differ in two crucial respects. First, where Pebble was to be located entirely on 
state land, the Donlin site is owned by the Calista Corporation, one of Alaska’s thirteen 
Native corporations. Second, while Pebble threatened the world-class commercial salmon 
industry in Bristol Bay, the Yukon-Kuskokwim region has no preexisting industry to 
counter the development promises of Donlin Gold. For these reasons, as well as the deep 
and longstanding divisions that Donlin inspired within and outside Kuskokwim-area 
communities, activists and community members in the Yukon-Kuskokwim region have 
been unable to access the same arrangements of public support for their work to protect 
fisheries and subsistence livelihoods. If resistance in Bristol Bay took place largely 
outside state and federal channels, the relative obscurity of the Donlin project and the 
lack of public support for Kuskokwim-area communities mean that local resistance there 
has largely taken shape around the public engagement segments of Donlin’s 
environmental impact assessment process.  
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 This chapter moves our focus from Bristol Bay to the Yukon-Kuskokwim in order 
to address questions of land use, development, and knowledge through a case that looks 
very different from Pebble. It begins first with a short history of the Yukon-Kuskokwim 
region, with a mind to the historically situated complexity surrounding the development 
and risk potentials at Donlin and with a specific focus on the arrangement of land title in 
the Donlin area. This is followed with a description of the official channels for public 
engagement with the Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (DEIS) for the Donlin project. This analysis examines the DEIS scoping 
meetings in particular. Third, I turn to an analysis of the public comments themselves, 
using a methodology similar to, but somewhat simpler than, that employed by USACE. 
Finally, this chapter ends with a description of the role of a coalition of expert consultants 
and community organizers in engaging with the public process in order to produce a set 
of technically literate, locally relevant DEIS comments. This final section draws on 
several dozen interviews conducted in winter and summer of 2017 with community 
members in Aniak, Napaimute, and Crooked Creek, scientific and legal consultants in 
Fairbanks and Anchorage, the Calista and Cook Inlet Regional Corporations, Donlin 
Gold representatives, members of state and federal regulatory bodies, and a number of 
longtime salmon and water rights activists across Alaska. This section argues that the 
public comment process is unable to capture the forms of community knowledge 
production and alternative land and knowledge imaginations that are central to 
deliberative and democratic public practices. 
	 70	
Land, Knowledge, and Economies in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Region 
The Yukon-Kuskokwim is, in many ways, not so different from the lands 
surrounding Bristol Bay. Both regions lie outside the reach of Alaska’s sparse road 
system, where numbered highways only just break into the double digits. And the 
residents of both regions have deep ties to their respective waterways: as direct sources of 
living and livelihood; as mediators of human and non-human action and interaction; as 
sites of cultural and historical significance; and as the features that give name to the lands 
they run through and upon. Bristol Bay villages sit, uniformly, on the edges of the 
region’s lakes and rivers – principally, massive Lake Iliamna and the Nushagak and 
Kvichak rivers – or cluster around the edge of the bay itself. As in the Bay, the Yup’ik 
and Athabascan people of the Yukon-Kuskokwim region live by its namesake waterways. 
The broad Yukon and Kuskokwim Rivers and their many tributaries and feeder streams 
serve as the primary modes of transportation between villages: In summer, they carry 
fleets of flat-bottomed metal boats driven by powerful Yamaha or Honda outboards as 
well as substantial barge traffic; in winter, they serve as ice roads for pickups and snow 
machines. The Kuskokwim River remains the longest undammed river in the United 
States, and in March 2018, the extension of the “Kuskokwim Highway” to Crooked 
Creek increased the length of the graded and marked ice road to over two hundred miles. 
During the liminal periods of fall freeze and spring breakup, when the river is not able to 
offer an unobstructed water route or stable ice for surface transport, travel between 
villages becomes a dangerous and time-consuming affair. Warming winters, too, are 
quickly shrinking the period during which the frozen river is safe for vehicle travel. 
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Inlanders along the upper and middle sections of the two rivers travel downriver 
with some frequency, despite the long distance between villages, and Bethel, the region’s 
largest town of over four thousand residents, sits just miles from where the Kuskokwim 
diverges into a marshy delta before emptying into the bay that bears its name. Distance, 
too, does not impede permanent moves between communities. “Everyone is related” 
along the rivers, remarks Lisa Feyereisen, a non-Native woman who married into the 
Aniak community decades ago and today serves on the village board at Chuathbaluk. The 
tight relationships even across the long reaches of the Kuskokwim have the additional 
consequence of contributing to a level of conflict and interpersonal risk in discussions 
surrounding the Donlin project. Given the strong divisions between those who support 
and those who oppose development – and that many of those divisions may exist within 
families and between neighbors – Kuskokwim-area residents are much less apt to discuss 
the project in casual conversation or in formal settings, especially when compared with 
the level of local conversation and awareness around the Pebble project. 
If Bristol Bay stands out from the rest of Alaska for its recognizable salmon 
industry, just as the North Slope is known for oil, then the Yukon-Kuskokwim may very 
well stand out for its conspicuous lack of the same. The Donlin project is the first major 
development site along either river since an abandoned attempt to dam the Yukon in the 
mid-1950s. Prior to the mid-20th century, neither mining nor transportation technology 
was advanced to the point that the region could seem attractive for commercial 
development on the scale of the mineral project at Donlin, small-scale Placer mining 
along the Kuskokwim notwithstanding. Unlike the territories of the subarctic North 
American bush that saw extensive commercial trapping operations – in central Quebec, 
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as early as the mid-1600s – the Yukon-Kuskokwim region is home to few profitable fur-
bearing animals. Even as whalers looked north to the Arctic Ocean, the coastal regions 
between the Kuskokwim Bay to the south and the outlet of the Yukon to the north proved 
too shallow for a viable whaling industry. Rearden and Fienup-Riordan (2016) explain: 
First, its lack of commercial resources meant that it was among the last parts of 
the state to experience sustained contact with the non-Native world. As a result, 
Yup’ik language and traditions remain more vital there. And third, although the 
economy struggles, subsistence activities – hunting, fishing, gathering from the 
land – remain essential. 
Minimal non-Native contact arrived with limited Russian Orthodox missionary 
activity in the early to mid-19th century. Aside from the modest churches topped by the 
double crucifix that still sit at the center of some villages, their primary legacy was a 
series of epidemic diseases that halved the population of southwest Alaska as soon as 
1830. These drastic, violent experiences with disease aside, the Yukon-Kuskokwim 
region went largely unnoticed by non-Native settlers even decades after the first Russian 
missionaries (Rearden and Fienup-Riordan, 2016). 
 Indeed, white settlement in the rest of Alaska remained minimal even by the late-
1800s. Where settlement in the contiguous states was driven by a perceived need to carve 
out private agricultural spaces for a growing population, Alaska was too cold, vast, and 
remote for the same questions of farming and space to find an urgent foothold. Likely 
drawing influence from Native policy in the Western states and territories, however, 
American settlers were quick to adopt the assimilation strategies then becoming popular 
in the lower 48. Prior even to the discovery of gold in the Juneau region, the federal 
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government had established a small number of English-medium boarding schools, often 
associated with Christian missions, that mirrored those in the contiguous states and in 
Canada; these were followed by more extensive, and more brutal, boarding school 
policies in the mid-20th century (Barhardt, 2001). The impact of these and other 
missionary projects can be felt across the generations that separate the contemporary 
Yukon-Kuskokwim from the initial periods of missionary activity a century ago. On the 
Bering Sea coast and up the Yukon River, the large dance assemblies and competitions 
that traditionally lifted sprits in the cold, dark hours of winter – and that oral tradition 
identifies as having brought an end to the warfare that characterized the centuries leading 
up to the early 1800s – are only just beginning to return following their prohibition by 
Jesuit churches in the late 19th century. Further south and up the Kuskokwim River, 
where Moravian missionaries held an even harder line against traditional customs, winter 
dance assemblies remain a relic of the past (Rearden and Fienup-Riordan, 2016). The 
Moravian focus on Yup’ik-language sermons, however, contributed to the continuance of 
the language in religious and day-to-day usage. Today, nearly half of the 26,000 residents 
of southwest Alaska speak Yup’ik as their first language, with even stronger local usage 
on the Kuskokwim in particular. 
 The relative lack of commercial development on the Yukon and Kuskokwim 
Rivers continues to the present, with strong consequences for those who make their lives 
and livings along the rivers. More than twenty percent of area residents live below the 
federal poverty line, and regional unemployment sits at sixteen percent or higher (Dept. 
of Labor, Bethel Census Area). Subsistence practices outstrip any other region in Alaska 
by pounds of food fished, hunted, and gathered per capita – due, perhaps, to the 
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continued strength of traditional language and culture alongside the necessity created by 
dire economics (Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2012). With the increasing 
urbanization brought on by federal assimilationist and boarding school policies in the 
1950s and 1960s, however, people today must travel further and further to access 
subsistence resources (Rearden and Fienup-Riordan, 2016). As gas routinely tops six or 
seven dollars per gallon along the middle and upper Kuskokwim, reliance on outboard 
motors, snow machines, and four-wheelers brought on by changes to cultures, economies, 
and settlement patterns is a greater economic burden than it may be in less remote regions 
of the North. 
Land Ownership 
A portion of Donlin’s divisiveness is undoubtedly due to the particular 
arrangement of land and mineral ownership at the Donlin claim and its associated 
infrastructure sites. The mine itself is under title of the Calista Corporation, one of the 
thirteen regional Native corporations chartered under ANCSA in 1973. The pipeline route 
to Cook Inlet passes through Calista land as well as portions administered by the federal 
government; a small section of the pipeline routing additionally passes an isolated parcel 
owned by Cook Inlet Region, Inc., the ANCSA corporation based in and around Cook 
Inlet southwest of Anchorage (Jason Bruni, interview, 2017). Both the Crooked Creek 
area, where the Donlin site is located, and the isolated CIRI parcel along the pipeline 
routing were selected under the post-ANCSA land dissemination process; like much of 
the land selected by regional corporations since the ANCSA agreement, both sites were 
chosen explicitly for their mineral potential (June McAtee, interview, 2017). 
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The pipeline parcel owned by CIRI is an especially interesting case. CIRI today 
represents a broad coalition of Athabascan, Inupiat, Yup’ik, Alutiiq and Aleut people 
whose traditional territory surrounds Cook Inlet, the Kenai Peninsula, and Anchorage. By 
the time the ANCSA compromise was drafted in the early 1970s, however, Anchorage 
and the Kenai Peninsula had long since urbanized, and the Alaskan legislature was, 
unsurprisingly, unwilling to return these thickly-settled areas to their still-living original 
owners. Most resource-rich areas around the Cook Inlet had additionally passed into 
private hands prior to the beginning of ANCSA negotiations, and much of the profitable 
land that was not already privately held was subject to federal land withdrawals through 
the Kenai National Moose Range or through federal military installations (Cook Inlet 
Region, Inc., 2006). Following a lengthy court process, CIRI settled with state and 
federal negotiators and gained title to large swaths of land initially conveyed to the state 
of Alaska. Additionally, CIRI was able to select resource-rich land holdings outside of its 
traditional territory: The parcel along the Donlin pipeline route is one such selection. 
Pipeline construction would provide CIRI easy transportation and power access for this 
outlying resource site, positioning the corporation as a strong supporter of development at 
Donlin despite having no connection to the gold contained in the Donlin site itself.  
This complex of land title and resource rights means that risk and benefit 
calculations in the Yukon-Kuskokwim differ substantially from those in Bristol Bay. 
Where Pebble was controversial because it threatened subsistence livelihood with little 
benefit to Native communities, Donlin represents a source of potential profit to the 
Calista and CIRI corporations, as well as a source of potential (short-term) employment 
for what some see as an economically depressed hinterland. Siting on Native land also 
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impacts the arrangement of permitting agencies and jurisdictions. State permitting 
coordinator Jeff Bruno, who works under the offices of Alaska’s Department of Natural 
Resources, describes these arrangements as follows: 
If it was completely on State land, we would do what's just a Plan of Ops 
review...And there are several volumes in that Plan of Ops: project description; 
waste management, which includes rock water and a bunch of other stuff; 
reclamation plan. And there's a bunch of other plans that I'm missing just off the 
bat. And because it's on Native land, the State only has primacy and authority 
over certain portions of those. We actually almost still review the entire thing, it's 
just a different process. The State still has primacy over reclamation to make sure 
that, even if you do a mine on Native land, we do make sure that there's enough 
money built into the reclamation and bonding costs for all that. (interview, 2017) 
Impact Assessment and Public Engagement 
The public centerpiece of large project permitting is the Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) process. Conducted under the auspices of the US Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), the EIS process seeks to determine the environmental and health 
impacts of large development projects in four phases: scoping (for Donlin, December 
2012 to March 2013), where potential impacts and study processes are identified for 
inclusion in the EIS; drafting (March 2013 to November 2015), in which USACE and its 
contractors collect their initial impact analysis; the public comment period (November 
2015 to May 2016), in which individuals and organizations have the opportunity to 
respond to the draft impact statement (DEIS); and the final EIS, a revised version of the 
DEIS that is supposed to incorporate the comment feedback deemed relevant by the lead 
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agency. I focus below on the two phases that allow for public input: The public meetings 
that make up a portion of scoping activity, and the DEIS public comment period. 
Scoping 
The DEIS scoping phase is a process in which USACE seeks to assess public 
input through a number of community meetings throughout the project area and, often, in 
Anchorage. Multinational engineering consulting firm AECOM oversaw the Donlin 
scoping process under contract with USACE. In scoping meetings, AECOM contractors 
present a broad outline of the project alternatives and give community members the 
opportunity to ask questions and respond to different stages of the planning and impact 
assessment process. The scoping process, according to former USACE Donlin project 
manager Richard Darden, is aimed primarily at allowing community members to raise 
issues that may be unfamiliar to state and federal agencies, as well as to gauge the 
importance of different social and environmental questions to specific communities. 
Scoping meetings are not a forum to weigh public support for or resistance to the project 
as a whole; rather, much like the comment processes that follow the DEIS itself, initial 
scoping meetings are geared toward gathering information, questions, or concerns 
relating to the specifics of project design and impact assessment: 
[Scoping meetings are] everyone’s chance to address what they think should be in 
the EIS. We’re coming at it from: what are the things that we may not recognize 
as being important, as being of interest. Sometimes you can predict that, and 
sometimes you’re surprised to recognize that an issue that you didn’t think was a 
big one is more in the public concern than you realized – and you say, ok, we 
should elevate our evaluation of this particular issue, because this is what people 
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are about. I’ve seen that on projects in the past. I’ve worked on some coal projects 
in the past. Green house gas at one point along the way wasn’t a big concern in 
the community, and suddenly over a period of years it became a very, very 
important concern that people had, and we took that into consideration and 
elevated our treatment of that topic in our documentation. That's the scoping 
process really having an impact on what we do. (interview, 2017) 
NEPA provides the general framework for scoping activities, but NEPA’s scoping 
requirements leave much room for interpretation by state agencies and local federal 
representatives. “NEPA is very general in regard to scoping activities,” said Darden. “It 
just says ‘you must conduct scoping.’” Scoping in this way is not unique to 
environmental impact assessment in Alaska, but the specific ways in which USACE and 
other agencies solicit public input is perhaps different from those in the more developed 
landscapes of the lower 48. Given the expense and difficulty of travel through the region 
and from the villages to state and federal offices in Anchorage, the scoping meetings that 
took place prior to Donlin’s DEIS were scattered throughout the small villages up and 
down the Kuskokwim River: Between January 14 and March 22, 2013, fourteen different 
meetings were held across the Yukon-Kuskokwim region and in Anchorage (URS 
Alaska, 2013). This approach had two related effects. First, their dispersion allowed 
residents of the more remote villages – some of which are a gas-heavy river trip or an 
expensive connecting flight away from the regional airports at Bethel and Aniak– a level 
of access to federal officials and complex technical information that would have been 
virtually impossible were the only public meetings held at the USACE offices. At the 
same time, in Darden’s words:  
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They don’t all get to hear what was said in Anchorage...[For example,] people in 
Crooked Creek may not get to hear what was said in Bethel until later, when they 
access transcripts from those scoping meetings, or they read the scoping report. 
(interview, 2017) 
Scoping meetings remain the primary vehicle for community members to interact 
with the design and methods of large project impact assessment, insofar as the assessment 
agencies incorporate public concerns into the design specifics of the impact assessment 
process. Scoping meetings are also the first formal outlets for community members to 
learn about and comment on the prospective project itself – and in this way, Darden’s 
characterization is an important window into the limitations coded into the way that rural 
development happens in Alaska’s hinterland. But scoping meetings, like other forms of 
public involvement, are specifically geared toward soliciting input on particular scientific 
or procedural artifacts; at no point do scoping meetings meaningfully ask for community 
direction on the shape of rural development as a whole.  
In Bristol Bay, where the Pebble mine never entered into formal EIS procedures, 
local community activists conducted independent meetings to gain familiarity with the 
project design and impact assessment process. Andrew describes these meetings as a key 
moment for community members to build collective understanding and public 
momentum: 
Annually we had – I think it was for four years – we had conferences in four 
different villages where we invited everyone to attend, and we had presenters 
from the federal government, the state government in the areas of mineral 
extraction. We had DNR come in and do a presentation on the permitting process, 
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and we had the federal government there on the NEPA process, and when it’s 
supposed to be kicking in. So there’s that whole gamut of education and 
information that was needed in the very beginning. (Bobby Andrew, interview 
with Bindu Panikkar, 2014) 
In contrast with the Donlin process, however, the Bristol Bay meetings were 
organized not by state or federal officials, but by community members in concert with the 
Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council. Public meetings were combined with a strategy 
that linked local activists with community leaders in other regions that had hosted large, 
extractive development projects. Just as public meetings in the Bristol Bay area helped to 
build local knowledge and expertise around the permitting and development process, 
conversations with tribes and communities in the lower 48 helped to build a picture of 
what the effects of large mine development could look like from the perspective of local 
people. Again, to draw on Andrew’s explanation: 
We went on a mine tour in Nevada, and we had a meeting with the Western 
Shoshone Tribe, and had a meeting with the Paiute Tribe in Yerington. We asked 
questions to the tribes – what impact has occurred since your reservations are so 
close to the mine sites. What has happened to your waters, what has happened to 
your lands. In both situations the answer was the same. It had contaminated the 
water, the environment, as well as the fish in the water and the animals that roam 
the grounds. And it made us start thinking – since the Pebble mine site is located 
in the headwaters of the Nushagack River, the Kvichak River, it wasn’t a good 
idea for the fish. And we opposed the project after that. (interview with Bindu 
Panikkar, 2014) 
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These conversations, as should be clear, look very different when local 
communities are as divided as they are along the Kuskokwim. The vernacular education 
process that Andrew describes could not proceed as smoothly in Aniak or Crooked 
Creek, due both to the lack of a unified opposition and a dearth of organizational or 
monetary resources to organize effective processes outside of those set out by the state. 
Still, local activists were, at times, able to influence the process by which the state 
gathered information from Kuskokwim-area communities. Feyereisen remembers one 
case in which she alongside other Aniak-area community members were able to slightly 
alter the federal and state engagement process: 
I got a little grant to bring the agencies out to Aniak. We brought elders from the 
rivers to talk to them. They made two extra meetings for us, to listen to our elders. 
That was important. (interview, 2017) 
This is also not to say that state-channeled scoping meetings were ineffectual 
within the bounds of their design. Donlin permit manager Patty McGrath remembers one 
moment in which community feedback at the early scoping meetings contributed to 
shifting, slightly, the role of traditional knowledge in the DEIS data collection process: 
One of the issues that came up during scoping was subsistence impacts, cultural, 
traditional knowledge, and the agencies determined, they looked at all the data 
and said, 'well, you know, here's a data gap. There is limited Traditional 
Knowledge information.’ So they had a number of workshops in Anchorage 
where they brought elders in, Knowledge Bearers in from tribes, to talk to them 
about Traditional Knowledge, their experience, and the wisdom that they have 
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about the land, and what they saw that the potential impacts could be, both 
positive and negative. (interview, 2017) 
Public Comments 
I now turn to the important public comment period. Following scoping, the next 
available forum for public input comes only once the DEIS itself is released. This is a 
formal public comment process where individuals and organizations may submit 
comments to the Army Corps for review. When USACE published the completed DEIS 
document in November 2015, they opened the comment process with a series of public 
discussions in each of the locations where a scoping meeting had been held (Darden, 
interview, 2017). Legally, the Corps is required to review – but not, necessarily, to 
respond – to the entire suite of public comments. For projects as well known and 
controversial as the Pebble Mine in Bristol Bay, public comments can number in the 
hundreds of thousands. For the relatively unknown Donlin project, meanwhile, DEIS 
comments tallied just over five hundred. Examining public comment processes, therefore, 
is necessary to understand the complex methods by which public concerns are integrated, 
or ignored, within the state’s environmental planning process. If the Pebble case can 
serve as an example of creative resistance outside the channels set down by state and 
federal regulatory processes, the Donlin case, here, allows for a more conventional 
example of what development looks like in a region with less national recognition and a 
more divided constituency.  
Public comment processes, today nearly universal in large project impact 
assessment and a key requirement under NEPA, were not always a given. Nor are public 
comments the only method to solicit public participation. Public participation processes, 
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including public comment periods such as those initiated under Donlin’s DEIS process, 
seek to navigate the tension between “democratic participation and the elaborate 
bureaucracy of large electorate government” (National Research Council, 2008); in so 
doing, they necessarily work to bridge certain gaps between the complex, technical 
expertise that marks large project impact assessment and the needs and knowledges of a 
less technically adept public. But public comment processes as they emerge today are 
hardly uncontested. Chilvers (2008) identifies three different camps: those who hope to 
keep a strict division between the analytical and deliberative (that is, to keep “facts” and 
“values” cleanly separated); those who hold that public involvement should be limited 
“by the extent to which nonscientists possess ‘contributory expertise’ that can 
complement or enhance certified scientific expertise”; and a third position, which holds 
that science and the political are not so separable, and that the public meaning embedded 
in science “needs to be considered as integral to decision making.” Of these three 
approaches, Darden’s USACE team seems to consider itself within the second.   
The tables below draw upon a complete content analysis of the 526 public 
comments associated with Donlin’s Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Benjamin 
Lemmond did the primary coding of these comments in late 2017 and early 2018. The 
USACE process – like scoping, conducted by AECOM contractors – aggregated 
comments through 17 public meetings and through submissions received via email, fax, 
and postal mail. AECOM analysts cut each individual comment into a series of 
statements, each of which spoke to a single aspect of the project; those statements were 
then recombined and binned within larger “Statements of Concern.” USACE (2016) 
describes that process as follows:  
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All submissions on the Draft EIS were read, reviewed, and dissected into discrete 
comments which were entered into a Comment Analysis System database, where 
reviewers sorted substantive comments into specific categories (e.g., Groundwater 
Impacts, Subsistence, Mitigation Measures). Substantive comments included 
requests for clarification, new information, criticisms of analysis methods and 
conclusions, and suggested improvements for the Final EIS.  
 Many of the comments within each category made similar points. 
Reviewers grouped like-comments and synthesized them into Statements of 
Concern (SOCs) that summarized each group of comments. For example, 24 
SOCs were written to summarize the 255 comments within the Subsistence 
category. This process ensures that every substantive comment is summarized by 
an SOC and is led appropriately in the database.  
Our analysis, below, is slightly different. We treat each comment as an individual 
data point, and bin each comment within broader categories, rather than cutting to the 
level of individual statements as does USACE. But the tables below, which present 
several of the most common themes identified through the content analysis process, can 
nonetheless provide an indication of what “public opinion” may look like to regulators 
and analysts at USACE and AECOM.  Full comment data is available in Appendix 1 at 
the end of this document. 
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Supporting comments 
Total support 284 
Mine will bring benefits to local economy 233 
Project is well-designed 153 
Project will benefit state economy, other ANCSA corporations 132 
Good relations between Donlin and community 112 
Infrastructure is a needed benefit 80 
Mine will not impact subsistence 72 
Development is necessary for autonomy (re: ANCSA) 69 
Development will bring education and job training 42 
Regulating agencies effectively protect environment 34 
Other mining projects are good examples for positive development  33 
DEIS is sufficient or is overstating impact of project 93* 
“No Build” (Alternative 1) will have negative impact on region 21 
Barging will have minimal impact 18 
 
Opposing comments 
Total oppose 93 
Mine will threaten subsistence 64 
Barges will impact Kuskokwim River ecosystem 36 
Pipeline will impact Iditarod trail 36 
Environmental impact is too great (risk is greater than reward) 33 
Concerns with waste and tailings 32 
DEIS is missing data, understating impact 238* 
DEIS is incomplete, missing other important data 35 
DEIS is incomplete, specifically with environmental risk assessment 23 
 
* These two rows add all of the different comments about the DEIS. While other rows count each public 
comment as a single tally, these rows may double-count some comments that are concerned with multiple 
specific components of the DEIS process. 
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 The DEIS public comments above present a picture of the potential project that 
fits well with established ideas of what development may promise – and what it may 
portent. Public comments are largely divided between supporters, who are concerned 
with the benefits the project may bring to local employment, infrastructure, and 
economies, and opponents, who favor the “no build” alternative on the grounds that the 
project implies an unacceptable level of risk to local people and ecosystems. This is not a 
surprising distribution. Indeed, it matches the descriptions of the conflict from interviews 
with Kuskokwim residents and consultants in Anchorage and Fairbanks that Donlin is 
“highly controversial,” both along the Kuskokwim River and in state and federal offices.  
 Comments also show the diversity of individuals and organizations involved in 
the discussions surrounding large rural development projects. While many of the 
comments were submitted by individuals who live or spend time in the region, a large 
proportion of the comments are associated with organizations – including a number of 
ANCSA Corporations and nonprofits – as well as federal offices such as the Bureau of 
Land Management. The Calista Corporation alone is responsible for seventeen comments 
submitted by individual employees. Supporters emphasize the long presence of Donlin 
Gold in the region as well as the technical skill of state and federal regulators; those who 
oppose the project, meanwhile, express concerns with the limitations they see in the 
DEIS process. Comments range from line edits, such as a portion of one of the BLM 
comments that notes the absence of temperature unit markers (Thorpe, 2016); to requests 
for documentation, including a request by the Center for Science in Public Participation 
for access to Donlin’s Health Impact Assessment (Craig, 2016); to qualitative statements 
about the impact of project on the region (Clautice, 2016). 
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Comments display a range of technical training. What is especially notable, 
however, is high level of technical familiarity displayed by the project’s opponents, many 
of who hold little formal education in geology, hydrology, or other technical fields. 
Comments mention specific components of the project design, including mercury risk 
and emergency response plans, as well as gaps in environmental risk data, including 
information on groundwater hydrology and fish ecology. As the tables above indicate, 
commenters identify specific technical concerns with multiple components of the project 
and the impact assessment process. Comments also, at times, provide supplemental data 
that challenges the information or interpretations of the DEIS document. Dave Cannon 
(2016), a former Department of Fish and Game official for the Aniak area who continues 
to live in the center of the village, submitted one such comment: 
Section 3.13-109 [of the DEIS] states: “Should the underlying geology of 
Crooked Creek reflect a high level of hydraulic conductivity, flow reductions in 
Crooked Creek between American Creek and Crevice Creek could be as high as 
85 to 100 percent during Year 20 of operations. Farther downstream in Crooked 
Creek, flow reductions of 40 to 31 percent could occur near Getmuna and Bell 
creeks, respectively (BGC 2015c). In this case, predicted streamflow reductions 
of such a high intensity would result in major impacts to salmon production in the 
middle and lower reaches of Crooked Creek.” 
Tom Myers (May 2016) notes that much of the area is geologically 
heterogeneous and that high K fault areas coupled with high K bedrock values 
could actually result in water losses of over three times that of the modeled 
scenarios provided by Donlin Gold.  
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While trends that indicate the divisiveness of the project or the diversity of 
commenters are easily predicted given even basic knowledge of Donlin’s social and 
economic context, the emergence of technically literate public comments that directly 
address specific components of the DEIS is not so obvious an outcome. Interviewees, in 
fact, uniformly listed the technical and specialized nature of the DEIS process as a 
significant barrier to public participation, and multiple organizations submitted requests 
to extend the public comment period beyond its initial 30-day limit to allow extra time 
for public education. The development of public comments familiar with the technical 
language of mineral extraction and impact assessment is perhaps the most significant 
outcome of the Donlin planning process. This forms the final section of this chapter, 
below, on the role of technical expertise in public engagement. 
Each of the statements of concern identified in this analysis would benefit from 
further research – indeed, the interviews collected for this project address many of the 
same technical concerns identified in the public comments themselves, including 
concerns with mining waste, consequences for subsistence, and the impact of increased 
barge traffic on Kuskokwim River salmon populations. Before turning to the role of 
technical expertise in public comment processes, I will look briefly at two issues that 
arose through the public comment data above, but which interviewees identified as 
having particular details not captured through the comment process: Donlin’s promise of 
local employment and the impact of pipeline construction on the Iditarod Trail. 
Following this, I move to a longer discussion of some of the strategies used by anti-
mining coalitions to engage with the comment process as a whole, in order to explain the 
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high level of technical proficiency seen in the portion of the comments that respond 
directly to particular sections of the DEIS. See Appendix 1, Table 4 for the full list of 
DEIS concerns. 
Employment 
Donlin’s primary benefit, to planners at the Calista offices in Anchorage, to local 
officials, and to Kuskokwim-area residents, is the promise to bring to the region its first 
major industrial employer. Calista Regional Corporation representatives, when 
interviewed, stressed the point that the initial exploration activities undertaken by 
PlacerDome drew up to ninety percent of their employment from local talent. Today, 
Donlin-led exploration continues to use local labor, although community members are 
sure to point out that much of that employment remains unskilled and low-paid. Skilled, 
technical work, meanwhile, is at times farmed out to a network of contractors and sub-
contractors, keeping local employment statistics high despite the lack of technical and 
permanent positions available to village residents (Aniak resident, interview, 2017). 
 Beyond the number or quality of jobs available to local residents, some 
interviewees raised concerns over the patterns by which large-scale mining operations 
organize workers. Earlier, smaller mineral projects held a certain permanence: Like in the 
early days of the Juneau strike, the difficulty of long distance travel, especially through 
the Alaskan bush, meant that mineral projects were necessarily residential. Mine workers 
would often relocate themselves – and, later, their families – to the area surrounding the 
mine site, and the company towns that developed around the sites often remained 
following closure. In the mine’s short lifespan – long enough to take up a large portion of 
an individual’s employable life, but too short to make for a sustained employment base 
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for a region – housing infrastructure could be the only remaining form of local 
development once the mine itself was exhausted. Today, mineral projects house workers 
only for their limited shifts – often, on a two-week rotation. “There used to be a mine up 
the Tuluksak River,” remembers a community official at one of the villages downstream 
from the Donlin site. “They built a town, with a school and everything. We asked them to 
do that here, but it’s all camps now...it’s the corporate world.”    
Iditarod trail 
Perhaps indicative of the remoteness of the Yukon-Kuskokwim region (at least 
compared to the internationally recognized fishery brand associated with Bristol Bay), 
Donlin’s primary public face outside of the region was not in the conservation-
development ambivalence that characterizes conversations along the Kuskokwim River 
itself, but in the various routing alternatives proposed for the planned fuel pipeline from 
the mine site to Cook Inlet. As planned, a 60-mile portion of the pipeline would run 
concurrent to the historic Iditarod trail through a tract of land administered by the federal 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The routing inspired some protest among the 
mushing community and fans. Ahead of the 2017 Iditarod race, the trail issue gained 
some traction in Alaska newspapers when the Iditarod Trail Committee invoked a little-
used race bylaw that bans participants from public criticism of race sponsors, including 
2017 sponsor Donlin Gold. When the Committee censured a number of politically active 
mushers for statements that critiqued the Donlin pipeline routing – including musher and 
salmon setnetter Monica Zappa, who ran with a pro-salmon banner in the years 
surrounding the early Pebble controversy – Alaskan papers started to pick up the story of 
the so-called “Donlin gag rule.” The “gag rule” gained additional social traction with a 
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February 2016 Anchorage Daily News piece by retired musher Dan Seavey. Seavey today 
remains a vocal part of the Alaskan mushing community, and his son Mitch and grandson 
Dallas have combined to win every race since 2012. The influence of the Seavey name 
inspired some attention in the Alaskan press: “Iditarod gag rule shameful: Race’s ban on 
disparaging comments by mushers wrongheaded,” read a Fairbanks Daily News-Miner 
editorial on March 6th; this was followed by another in the Mat-Su Valley Frontiersman, 
just north of Anchorage, with sporadic media attention continuing through the summer. 
But the Iditarod controversy was specific and short-lived, and comparing the Iditarod 
issue with the sustained global attention to the Pebble controversy only underscores 
Donlin’s relative insignificance – at least in terms of widespread public attention.  
Technical Consultants and Community Organizers 
Beyond the specific relevance of the employment and pipeline issues cited above, 
the most significant aspect of Donlin’s DEIS public comment process remains the 
technical familiarity displayed by many of its layperson commenters. This characteristic 
of the public comment documents implies a larger question: How are technical and 
traditional knowledge practices arranged in communities along the Kuskokwim River, 
and how have those always overlapping knowledges shifted through the many years of 
debate over development at Donlin? Here, I turn to a series of interviews with a number 
of technical consultants to understand the relationship between external experts and 
community-based organizers that contributed to this arrangement of multiple approaches 
to knowledge emergent in the Donlin public engagement process. 
These interviews began with a January 2017 meeting with Julia Mickley, the 
clean water and mining coordinator for the Northern Alaska Environmental Center in 
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Fairbanks. Over the prior weeks, Benjamin and I had spoken with the Large Project 
Coordinator for Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources, the Permitting Manager at 
Donlin Gold, LLC, and the board of directors at the Calista Native Corporation; we had 
lived in a language of development alternatives, impact studies, pipeline routings, and 
regulatory processes. I thought we had developed a clear picture of what was at stake: 
That development at the Donlin site was a near-certainty, supported strongly in offices in 
Anchorage and in the communities in the Yukon-Kuskokwim area. Donlin Gold’s 
permitting manager, who had spent nearly a decade with the EPA prior to working for the 
mining company, assured us that this project was an exception to Alaska’s controversial 
mining history –that Donlin had the support and the science to complete a project with 
real benefit to the villages and the people. 
 But Mickley told a different story. Donlin Gold had been extremely effective at 
controlling the narrative of resource development in the Yukon-Kuskokwim region, she 
said. The company has been actively pursuing mineral exploration in the tundra – and 
public relations in area villages – for over a decade, sponsoring cultural events, public 
gatherings, and sled-dog races. Donlin “had built up a lot of good will,” Mickley said. 
Dissent, in Anchorage and in the Y-K delta, had become increasingly difficult and 
socially dangerous. Her description would be confirmed by a number of community 
organizers in interviews several months later. These characterizations – that opposition to 
the project had the potential to bring with it serious social consequences, primarily – lead 
me to treat the words of Kuskokwim-area residents with careful anonymity. 
 The mission of the Northern Center, according to Mickley, was to facilitate 
communication within and between communities in which opposition to the mine had 
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been driven underground. Mickley described a complex support infrastructure that had 
developed through a series of conversations between the Northern Center, the 
Anchorage-based Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT), and environmental 
lawyers at EarthJustice (EJ). We had spoken to ACAT’s director as well as EJ’s mining 
coordinator in Anchorage. My conversation with Julia, however, was the first in which I 
had been aware of the extent of their collaboration. Peter Heiser, an EJ lawyer who had 
spent a number of months combing the DEIS document alongside the rest of the 
consultant support team, describes the relationship between EJ and the Northern Center:  
We've been working with (the Northern Center) from the start, and then, the 
group kind of coalesced around this interesting mix of advocacy organizations 
and different experts in the region and outside the region. There were a few 
biologists from the Kuskokwim River delta area, fish biologists mainly, who used 
to work for the State, and were obviously interested in how the mine might affect 
fish populations, and then also some experts from the Lower 48. One group we've 
worked with is Earthworks [based in Montana]. (interview, 2017) 
 Consultants largely consisted of trained legal, scientific, and advocacy experts. 
The Northern Center additionally had hired hydrologist Tom Meyers, cited above. Dave 
Cannon, also cited above, emerged as another central figure in coordinating outside 
expertise with local organizations. Consultants would often come on board for a specific 
issue; Meyers, for instance, was hired to look at the proposed design for the mine’s pit 
lake and how the dewatering process, in which groundwater is removed from the site to 
allow the mine excavation to proceed, could affect water levels in Crooked Creek 
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(Heiser, interview, 2017). His analysis was eventually included in the EarthJustice set of 
DEIS comments submitted in May 2017. 
The consultant team had focused on the DEIS public comment process as a 
unique moment for dissenting voices to enter the public record. Their work, in Mickley’s 
telling, was to provide infrastructure for local communities to understand the DEIS 
process and, crucially, to connect communities with the legal and scientific knowledge 
necessary to make their case to the Army Corps. Through sustained conversations carried 
out over a period of months, the Northern Center and its Anchorage allies provided local 
residents with significant access to material and logistical support. They also supported 
the Native Village of Napaimute and others in their successful petition to the Army 
Corps’ to extend the comment period to six months – half of their goal of a full year, but 
substantially longer than the standard 30-day period (Heiser, interview, 2017; see also 
Appendix 2, Native Village of Napaimute Resolution 16-02). In a case where the 
collected volumes of permitting and DEIS documents would fill a small bookshelf, the 
comment extension was a much needed break. 
An expansive National Research Council study on the design and implementation 
of public comment processes identifies a number of organizing concepts in the historical 
debates surrounding public engagement (National Research Council, 2008). Proponents 
of public comment processes hold that they are necessary for democratic engagement and 
collective action. Additionally, proponents argue that public engagement has the potential 
to improve environmental decisions by providing a venue to integrate locally grounded, 
sensitive, contextual information into the practice and operationalization of project design 
and risk assessment. Opponents, meanwhile, claim that not only is the public often 
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incapable of considering the technoscientific complexities of project design, but that 
public comment processes are often less representative than they claim (National 
Research Council, 2008). But Mickley’s description reveals something more complex 
than a dichotomy of knowledgeable, scientific experts and a technically inept public. It 
appears instead that the public process itself, through the requirement that comments 
conform to the technical and scientific regulatory apparatus of the state, produces a body 
of knowledge that is both locally-rooted and scientifically legible. Residents of Yukon-
Kuskokwim area villages, with the material aid of the Northern Center and organizations 
in Anchorage, were able to access scientific and legal expertise at the same time that they 
were drawing upon their own knowledge of their traditional territory. In Mickley’s 
words: “We were able to provide scientific support for what they knew was happening to 
their land.” 
This is borne out in the public comment data presented above, but it is not 
necessarily emergent in the way the data may be collected and displayed. Like the 
USACE/AECOM analysis, the codes above do demonstrate a strong understanding of the 
particularities of the Donlin project and the underlying scientific and regulatory 
questions. Comments in support of and in opposition to the project are highly proficient 
technically, focusing on specific components of the DEIS process or the scientific and 
technical work that is the foundation of mine permitting and impact assessment. What is 
not captured, however, in any coding system, are the complexities of what Mickley 
described: The central role of community members and traditional knowledge in shaping 
the data collection and analysis undertaken by residents and their allies at the Northern 
Center. In Bristol Bay, community-led land planning projects were able to draw upon 
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scientific data to support the traditional knowledge that was at the root of the Nushagak-
Mulchatna Watershed Council and Tim Troll’s research programs; the Northern Center, 
here, appears to have performed some of the same functions for residents along the 
Kuskokwim River. But the inherent hybridity of the knowledge production processes 
undertaken by Bristol Bay activists and Northern Center consultants alike disappears 
through a public comment methodology that is concerned solely with quantifiable 
outcomes. 
The public comment process, designed as it is to identify and fill gaps in EIS data, 
is perhaps structurally unable to capture the procedural and political structures that 
surround community knowledge production. Public input may “make or break the whole 
process right off the bat,” in Darden’s words, but it is hardly a forum for deliberative and 
democratic decision-making. That deliberation takes place in Anchorage office buildings 
with card-access elevators. Access to those deliberative forums was one of the major 
narratives of Kuskokwim-area community organizing, insofar as a number of tribal 
entities were able to gain access to the cooperative agency meetings in which USACE, 
DNR, and other agencies with permitting authority or relevant expertise work to shape 
the impact assessment priorities and processes.  
The social and economic context of the Yukon-Kuskokwim affords a very 
different set of tools for those who seek to halt development at the Donlin site when 
compared with the possibilities afforded to activists in Bristol Bay. The lack of strong 
commercial activity, combined with the region’s relatively small recreational fishing 
business, means that local development depends to a degree on resource projects that are 
not as ecologically dependent as Bristol Bay’s diverse fishing industries. This lack of a 
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recognizable ecological “brand” also leaves local activists without strong external 
support, limiting the range of viable anti-mining strategies. With this in mind, community 
organizations and external consultants concentrated their strategies on the existing DEIS 
public engagement process – which, as detailed above, is meant not to solicit public 
visions for how development may proceed, but instead is designed to allow for the public 
to identify possible gaps in environmental impact and risk data. Where activists in Bristol 
Bay were able to combine their critique of Pebble’s possible impact with a process of 
envisioning locally relevant, community-led development, the context of the Yukon-
Kuskokwim afforded no such deliberative potential. One interviewee, a community 
leader of one of the Kuskokwim-area villages who asked to remain anonymous, 
recognizes this limitation  
We need something and this is the only thing on the table. Population growth out 
here is crazy. People live off the land less than they used to. They were building 
new hospital in Bethel, and had 600 people apply for jobs for construction. They 
hired maybe 4. [It’s all] outside people. Specialized work. (interview, 2017) 
 The infrastructure and development promises of the Donlin project, today, are 
some of the only large-scale options currently under consideration in the Yukon-
Kuskokwim region. Donlin’s EIS process, likewise, is the only public process currently 
under way that allows Yukon-Kuskokwim residents to weigh in on regional development, 
employment, infrastructure, and environmental planning. But the employment and 
infrastructure benefits promised by the Donlin project are side effects: Donlin is designed 
not as a community-oriented development project, but as an extractive, temporary 
resource scheme. The public process surrounding the Donlin project, likewise, is not 
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designed to solicit public input on regional development as a whole, but rather to ensure 
that the mine can proceed with minimal public opposition. 
Conclusion: Imagining Development 
In March 2017, the Native Village of Napaimute began to transport a newly 
purchased sawmill down the frozen Kuskokwim River to a site just below the village of 
Kalstag. The project promised to employ nearly as many people as the ongoing 
exploratory activity at the Donlin site, and the winter route was chosen in part because 
constructing the Kuskokwim ice road relies on local labor – in contrast with the barges 
that run up and down the river in the summer, which are owned and operated by outside 
companies. It was a locally organized, locally imagined project: “The sawmill was the 
idea of the local Napaimute Council,” emphasized the same anonymous community 
leader quoted above. “Not Calista or the Kuskokwim Corporation.” While the sawmill 
project cannot, on its own, solve the employment and infrastructure needs of the region, it 
will likely outlast the twenty-five year lifetime of the mine. The firewood and lumber 
produced at the mill, too, are products that Kuskokwim-area communities depend upon 
directly.  
The public engagement process that accompanies Donlin’s DEIS is, for many, the 
only chance to weigh in on what regional development could look like. Despite Darden’s 
assertion that the public comment process is not concerned with whether communities 
support or oppose the project as a whole – but rather, what kinds of data the impact 
assessment may be missing – many of the comments submitted by individual community 
members do speak to these larger notions of how communities imagine development and 
incorporate social, economic, and environmental change into their livelihoods and life 
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ways.  For some, the infrastructure promises of the Donlin project are too strong to pass 
up. For others, however, the economic opportunities promised by the sawmill project – 
and, crucially, the local control over its construction and operation – represent an 
alternative pathway to employment, training, and development that may avoid the 
programmatic and environmental consequences inherent to the kind of industrial-scale 
development that Donlin represents.   
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CHAPTER 5: SUBSISTENCE 
The preceding chapters investigated two case studies in rural development, 
knowledge construction, and local resistance. While the cases address questions of risk 
and benefit in different ways and with different emphases, underlying both the Pebble 
and Donlin debates is the central question of the role of subsistence in rural Alaskan 
living, culture, and identity. This short chapter addresses the place of subsistence in 
contemporary Alaska and its relationship to land, identity, and development – issues that, 
at times, can disappear behind the language of quantifiable impact.  
Subsistence is Alaska’s original economy and a vital part of Alaska Native culture 
and rural Alaskan living. To many, subsistence is a chosen way of life, a lifestyle, a 
philosophy, and an ideal of self-sufficiency. It is also a necessity for many rural 
communities. Though it provides a large portion of rural Alaskan nutrition, subsistence is 
difficult to quantify, as it is not considered as part of employment or Gross State Product 
data. ANILCA does not define subsistence itself, but defines subsistence “uses” as 
follows:  
. . . the customary and traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of wild, 
renewable resources for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, 
fuel, clothing, tools or transportation; for the making and selling of handicraft 
articles out of nonedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken for 
personal or family consumption; for barter or sharing for personal or family 
consumption; and for customary trade. 
 But subsistence is not devoid of economic pressures. In an ethnographic study of 
subsistence practices of both Yup’ik natives and non-natives in Bethel, the largest town 
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on the Kuskokwim River and the center of Lower Kuskokwim economic activity, Chase 
Hensel (1996) reveals that many subsistence activities, such as moose and goose hunting, 
have significant monetary cost when gas, equipment, ammunition, food, and other 
expenses are considered. This is an additional burden, given that many subsistence foods 
are not monetized, and that many of the delicacies of the region are illegal to sell or do 
not have commercial value (Hensel, 1996). Subsistence land imaginaries represent more 
than a subset of resource use, but rather are an essential component of human, cultural, 
and cosmological meaning. 
Regional identity and local knowledge systems in rural Alaska are based in part 
on the joint construction of the land and the practice of subsistence. “It’s not just the 
fishing, it's not just the fish,” says Kenai-based anthropologist Alan Boraas. “It's the 
social dimension and the spiritual dimension of what it is to live on the land, catching 
wild salmon and other food resources in the manner of their ancestors” (interview with 
Bindu Panikkar, 2014). Subsistence is an economic-cultural-historical practice in which 
social identity and relationships with the land are built and practiced in tandem. To the 
late Harvey Samuelson, local leader and subsistence fisher based in the Bristol Bay 
village of Dillingham, “land is the heart of our culture; without the land, we are nothing ” 
(Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council, 2007). The land and ecosystem, in this way, 
can be thought of as a source and mediator of social relationships, cultural identities, and 
knowledge. Land-based relationships, mediated by subsistence practices, thus imply a 
radically different orientation toward the land than the profit motivations of extractive 
resource development or even the solely utilitarian definition of subsistence resource use 
as defined by the state. Land as a knowledge base, a source of culture, and a guarantor of 
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food and water security represents something far more vital than a tract of property or a 
picturesque setting for a profitable resource.  
While subsistence users draw upon multiple resources – including agricultural 
products, game, and numerous species of fish – salmon emerge as the key link between 
culture, subsistence, and even market economies through the lens of the commercial and 
recreational fishing industries. Salmon and threats to the wild salmon economy were the 
central imaginaries that provided the foundation for an intersectional politics of alliance 
building across local subsistence fishers, commercial fishing industries, sports fishers, 
and tourism enterprises in Bristol Bay, and it was the body of the salmon – its distinctive 
underbite and deep red flesh – that held resonance at the national level. Schlosberg and 
Coles’ new environmentalism focuses on reconfiguring activism based on promoting 
local identities and material flows that are more sustainable; the construction of resources 
and economies in Bristol Bay, however, privilege the renewable wild salmon fisheries 
over the sustainable or renewable aspects of subsistence livelihood even within the 
unlikely coalition between commercial and subsistence fishers. Precarious subsistence 
practices, vital as they are in Bristol Bay, were not enough to capture the (economic) 
imaginations of broader US culture, and subsistence practices continue to face challenges 
stemming from a limited resource base and the growing demands of surface and sub-
surface resource extraction. Likewise, even while local concerns along the Kuskokwim 
River revolve around maintaining the health of the environments that support the region’s 
strong subsistence cultures, it was the Iditarod controversy – not the possible threats that 
development at Donlin posed to subsistence lives and livelihoods – that captured, for a 
short time, the eyes of the Alaskan press.  
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The 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan revision process, in which Bristol Bay tribes 
successfully sued to have their critiques of the plan taken into account, emerged as a rare 
arena in which indigenous approaches to land, based in subsistence use and relationality, 
were afforded space in the state’s land planning procedures. But that space soon proved 
insufficient to radically alter Bristol Bay land designations, and today Bristol Bay land 
use is still driven by a management plan that fails to protect habitat and subsistence 
practices. The Alternative Area Plan’s “subsistence” category and the extensive 
documentation of traditional knowledge that undergirded the locally-produced 
Conservation Plan has yet to be substantially considered by state or federal land planners. 
And on the Kuskokwim, without a powerful fishing industry to elevate its message, the 
threat that Donlin would pose to sustainable subsistence on and around the river has 
largely failed to reach audiences that were not already paying attention. Even the 
successes of local communities in building hybrid comments that are both technically 
proficient and locally rooted may only be understood in retrospect – and only once the 
deliberative, democratic action they model can be realized in development policies or 
sovereignty agreements that recognize the epistemic and procedural components of 
environmental justice.  
Experiential or embodied knowledge, which is specific to regional social-
ecological systems, is not “portable” nor as easily transmutable as the procedural practice 
of state and corporate scientists. Community strategies that relied upon hybrid knowledge 
production, in this case, were an organized, creative response to these limiting conditions. 
But where the alternative planning documents that came out of Bristol Bay in the early 
2010s sought to translate traditional knowledge into a form that was legible to state and 
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federal audiences, planners in Anchorage and Washington, DC did not always meet them 
halfway. 
Local epistemologies and issues of justice, uncertainty, and power are frequently 
removed from public debates, and are not meaningfully incorporated into environmental 
decision-making. Environmental justice activists here demand not just consideration of 
their cultural identities and civic epistemologies within the regulatory system, but also 
epistemic justice and “the right to be respected in their capacities as knowers” (Ottinger 
et al, 2016; Frickel, 2007). While the state’s environmental assessment process asks only 
for local input on possible risks associated with large project development, the documents 
produced under the Nushagak-Mulchatna Watershed Council instead ask: How should we 
manage our land? What does responsible development look like? It is this power to ask, 
as well as to answer, that the permitting process works to limit. The procedural and 
epistemic restrictions imposed by development and impact assessment policy, in this way, 
must be seen as tools of systemic injustice.  
To complicate further, it is only through a colonial lens that the practice of 
subsistence can be thought of as wholly “unscientific.” Subsistence provides deep 
ecological knowledge, land skills and robust understandings of complex ecosystem 
functions, but ‘science’ on the ground is more than the accidental agreement between 
subsistence-based knowledge and peer-reviewed data. Ann Fienup-Riordan, longtime 
collaborator with the CEC in their project to articulate and preserve traditional ecological 
and subsistence knowledge, remarks that “The Yup'ik people have no word for science, 
yet their tools were so well designed that they allowed the Yupiit to live in a land no one 
else would inhabit…[The] Yup'ik way of life – both past and present – is grounded in 
	 105	
deep spiritual values and scientific principles” (Fienup-Riordan, 2008). Conversations 
around hybridity are, in this way, not simply a question of science and non-science, but 
rather must treat these categories in their full, intimate entanglement.  
When the state redrew land boundaries in the mid-20th century, under Alaska’s 
statehood agreement and the ANCSA compromise, it introduced sets of borders that were 
foreign to the onto-epistemic and land practices of Alaska’s first peoples. The tracts 
allotted to Native villages were often insufficient to support subsistence livelihoods, 
requiring village residents to rely on land outside their sovereign territory (Ross, 2006). 
New land boundaries that are insufficient for subsistence survival create new 
dependencies, putting Alaska Native populations in constant threat of a combined loss of 
lifestyle and livelihood when land designations change. Not only do communities rely on 
subsistence access to federal lands, but the ecosystems, watersheds, and animal migration 
routes themselves cross these land use boundaries. Land use decisions that apply to 
adjacent areas thus have the potential to impact access to Native-owned subsistence 
grounds as well as the subsistence resources in nearby regions (Gallagher, 1987). It is for 
these reasons that even the construction of large industrial projects on lands adjacent to – 
but not overlapping – Native-owned territory has the potential to threaten subsistence 
cultures, knowledge, and economics. Both Donlin and Pebble would, in this way, 
represent a reevaluation of the calculus of land use in their respective regions, whereby 
alterations to topographies and use driven by visions of extractive profit come to 
supersede the relational and renewable forms of land use implied in the body of the 
salmon and the practice of subsistence. “It is more than saying ‘you are taking away my 
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food,’” Miller argues. People are trying to say that “development is going to extinguish 
who I am as a person” (Heather Kendall Miller, interview with Bindu Panikkar, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
Public discourses surrounding questions of development and land use in the lower 
48 often emerge in a predictable pattern. Development promises employment, 
infrastructure, modernity; conservation, its natural antithesis and necessary opponent, 
promises to protect landscapes and peoples from the environmental or existential risks 
that are inherent to industrialization. But this dichotomy does not map so easily onto the 
Alaskan context; in fact, to draw upon a development-conservation model in Alaska is to 
fall into two definitional traps. First, the development-conservation model as applied to 
rural Alaskan projects serves to enroll questions of Native land rights into a definition of 
land conservation focused on the maintenance of pristine and untouched natural 
environments. Its outgrowth – expanding national parks, refuges, or protected land – has 
the potential to erase from public conversation the organization of communities and 
forms of land use, such as subsistence use and seasonal migration to fishing or hunting 
grounds, that long predate the presence of Western bodies or Western ontologies in the 
territory. At times, definitions of pristine and untouched wilderness and the forms of land 
protection they engender have directly limited Native habitation and subsistence use by 
closing protected areas to all forms of human use – industrial or subsistence based – 
effectively treating subsistence land use as simply another form of human exploitation 
that is categorically equivalent to industrial-scale resource development. Second, under 
these definitions, land comes to exist solely as a site or provider of human value. Land 
use, therefore, becomes a question of the adjudication of two exclusive value questions: 
The potential of profitable resource use, on the one hand, and the experiential quality of 
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pristine wilderness on the other. Native land claims, sovereignty, and subsistence forms 
of land use that exist outside of the motivations of private profit are lost in the gaps. 
It could be argued that the discursive field surrounding large resource 
development projects, by the early 2000s, had largely solidified around development and 
conservation themes to the exclusion of other discourses. While Pebble and Donlin actors 
and activists certainly developed effective strategies to harness existing discursive 
structures that privilege conservation discourses as the primary means to oppose 
narratives of profitable exploitive development, they also managed to draw on certain 
hybridities that worked to bridge these gaps between the technically or popularly legible 
and the locally relevant. These strategies are visible in the role of consultant-activist-
community coalitions in the Yukon-Kuskokwim, which worked to translate traditional 
and experiential knowledge into a form that would hold sway in state and federal offices, 
as well as in the work of Nunamta Aulukestai and other local organizations to build 
alternative visions of land use and management in the Bristol Bay region. By 2010, when 
Nunamta Aulukestai’s permit lawsuit rose to Alaska’s Superior Court, it was only natural 
that the individual plaintiffs would include both subsistence fishers and a commercial 
setnetter. But this development-conservation duality also imposed a set of conditions on 
the kinds of arguments, strategies, and policies that were legible to policymakers and the 
public. Analogous to the complexities of the ANCSA agreement itself, the discursive 
fields surrounding Pebble, Donlin, and other development projects operate as sites of 
both agency and containment; they provide a surface for creative discursive strategies 
while simultaneously policing the boundaries of legitimate argument.  
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State-led land planning is rooted in a history and ideology of “land” as a source of 
profit, from the trappers and prospectors who made up Alaska’s first European settlers to 
contemporary economic structures that tie state budgets to the successful exploitation of 
the earth’s resources. These traditions emphasized the rational, scientific management of 
discrete land resources in order to maximize production and profit (Scott, 1999). Written 
into governance through decades of regional land planning documents and into the 
landscape by decades of industrial scarring, land-as-extraction-site can be thought of as 
what Mukerji (1994) terms “geo-politics”: A process by which “the state uses 
technological means to transform the land into both a resource for administration and 
symbol of state power.”  
Both the Donlin and Pebble cases draw out certain tensions between traditional 
knowledge and Western scientific epistemologies; between sovereign land, and land that 
is privately held and arranged to produce extractive profit; between deliberative, localized, 
vernacular decision making, and the governmentality of the technocratic state. But it 
would be a mistake to view either case as something so simple as a collision between 
opposed, rarified onto-ethico-epistemic systems. Just as Latour and others have pulled 
apart the necessarily fraught ontological divisions between “natural” and “social” worlds, 
Western and traditional knowledges are in contested, cooperative conversation – even in 
the regions of the Yukon-Kuskokwim where contact with the West and with the social 
functions of the state were more recent and less total.  
The continuance of subsistence practices the continued relevance of traditional 
knowledge in rural Alaska is a result of both the resilience of subsistence practitioners 
and the continued relevance of subsistence practices and worldviews to contemporary, 
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hybrid lives. It is in the hybrid spaces between Western extractive use and indigenous 
subsistence imaginaries where we can see the work of cognitive justice enacted in service 
of concrete material goals, and it is in the navigation of these discursive and strategic 
boundaries that the tensions between and within knowledge regimes are made strikingly 
clear.  
Conceptions of subsistence-based approaches to land today emerge as a mode to 
subtly claim definitional control over the land and its “resources” and to reframe 
knowledge production and land planning as community-based, participatory projects. 
Unfortunately, Alaska’s large mine permitting process is often structurally and 
epistemologically unable to consider these divergent discourses and the public 
imaginations of alternative futures they support and constitute. The Pebble and Donlin 
cases are two examples of many in global debates surrounding development, 
conservation, land use, and indigenous sovereignty. As the modified Pebble proposal 
trails Donlin through the hallways and across the desks of Alaskan state offices and 
federal permitting agencies, both documents will undoubtedly be subject to subtle, 
meaningful revisions. With recent changes to state and federal land management 
priorities in Alaska’s increasingly desperate economy, it remains to be seen whether the 
successes of the coalitions that arose to temporarily defeat Pebble will be repeatable. 
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APPENDIX 1: PUBLIC COMMENT ANALYSIS 
 
Category Table 1: IN FAVOR Count 
Economic benefit Will Create Local/Regional Economic Benefit 233 
 Will benefit people throughout the state / AK economy / 
ANCSA revenue sharing 
132 
 Education and/or job training impacts extend beyond life 
of mine 
42 
 Will Benefit other private companies 21 
 Will Benefit Calista Corp. 5 
Infrastructure benefits Infrastructure is needed/cost-of-living benefits 80 
Minimal impact Little/No Environmental Impact, Design is good 153 
 No cultural heritage (esp. Iditarod) impact 43 
 Scale of impacts is small (or reward > risk) 9 
Mining companies are 
benevolent / have the interests of 
the region at heart 
Good relationships between Donlin and community, good 
behavior by Donlin 
112 
 Other mining projects were good examples (Red Dog, etc.) 33 
Opposition is illegitimate Opposition comes from outside groups  2 
Regulations are effective Regulating agencies effectively protect the environment 34 
 Spill response plan by Donlin is adequate 1 
 Neutral or net positive impact on subsistence, keep people 
from leaving region 
72 
 Will reduce social ills (alcoholism, depression, etc.) 
through good-paying work 
23 
 Prevent people leaving the community 15 
Sovereignty / autonomy Indigenous or local autonomy/ANCSA Mandate to 
develop 
69 
 AK state/USA autonomy/mandate 18 
 
 
Category Table 2: IN FAVOR, DEIS Count 
DEIS is legitimate Draft EIS is sufficient 11 
 NEPA / EIS Process is adequate / gives adequate time 9 
Specific comments on 
development options 
"No Build" / Alternative 1 will have negative 
consequences 
21 
 Barging as proposed is not an issue (no Alternative 
3A/3B) 
18 
 No alternate pipeline route (no Alternative 6) 9 
 No dry stack tailings (no Alternative 5) 6 
 Port location is fine (no Alternative 4) 4 
 No Diesel Pipeline (no Alternative 3B) 2 
Regulations are overly limiting Permitting process takes too long 4 
 HIA is flawed 3 
 BLM subsistence report is inaccurate 2 
 DEIS inappropriately characterizes impacts on Barge 
traffic (will not create a significant increase) 
2 
 DEIS overstates environmental impact 1 
 DEIS improperly includes 'worst-case scenario' events 1 
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Category Table 3: OPPOSED Count 
Corruption Concern with influence on Iditarod Committee; other 
nefarious influences 
6 
EJ Environmental Justice concerns 7 
Environ risk Concerned w threat to subsistence resources  64 
 Environmental risk is too great (risk>reward) 33 
 General concern with impacts 24 
Health and contamination Concerns with Hg 22 
 Concerns with Cyanide 18 
 Long-lasting contamination; after mining is finished, 
locals bear burden of pollution for no benefit 
13 
 Concerns with fugitive dust 8 
 Other Human Health Concerns 7 
 Concerns with storing HAZMATS at dock facility 2 
Infrastructure concerns Concerned w Barging 36 
 Concerns with pipeline impacts, incl. impacts to Iditarod 36 
 Concerned with waste rock/tailings dam/pit lake 32 
Inherent risk Scale /scope too vast to ever be safe or well regulated - no 
way to enforce some things (perpetuity) / safe regulation is 
impossible 
19 
 Accidents are inevitable 7 
Local vs. regional Economic consequence / increased gov't interference if 
borough is established 
1 
 Will not benefit tribes 1 
 Native Corporations do not speak for locals 1 
Mines have bad record Companies /mines have bad track record 23 
Negative econ impact Jobs will not go to locals / NEGATIVE economic impact 
from outflow 
4 
Right to know Right to Know issues, e.g. identity of HAZMATs on river 2 
Social impacts Concerns with impacts on local population/resource 
balance / ATVs etc. that come from increased access 
8 
 Concerns with mental health, social issues (crime, 
addiction, etc.), and health care impacts of mine 
2 
Misc. other concerns Misc. other concerns 13 
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Category Table 4: OPPOSED, DEIS Count 
Access to information Need public data reporting on mine once in operation 1 
Assurance and mitigation DEIS does not include emergency response plan/lacks 
necessary info to inform emergency response plan 
12 
 Need a better financial assurance 12 
DEIS process flawed DEIS structurally flawed (segmented/not comprehensive) 6 
 DEIS makes promises it can't keep about ensuring good 
behavior 
3 
 ACE did not consult with ANCs 1 
 DEIS is too long/difficult to read (but no request for 
extension) 
2 
Missing information DEIS lacking/incorrect in some other area 35 
 DEIS doesn't adequately address impacts to stream 
/groundwater hydrology 
15 
 Not enough information to compare various alternatives in 
DEIS / missing options 
15 
 DEIS fails to or inadequately incorporates climate change 
into assessment / Climate change affects level of concern 
for project 
14 
 DEIS doesn't adequately address fish ecology 11 
 DEIS doesn't address impacts to port of Bethel / local 
travel along Kuskokwim river 
10 
 Contradictory findings on subsistence (BLM / DEIS 
reports differ), DEIS doesn't address this 
7 
 DEIS Lacking HIA 3 
 DEIS inadequately assesses human health impacts 2 
Regulations are insufficient DEIS - Insufficient assessment of environmental impact 23 
Risk underestimated DEIS should include 'worst-case scenario' for dam failure 14 
 DEIS underestimates tailings dam risk 10 
 DEIS improperly characterizes fuel spill risk 6 
 DEIS underestimates seismic risk 6 
 DEIS improperly characterizes Hg risk 5 
 DEIS inappropriately assesses economic impacts and true 
cost of the mine 
4 
 Mitigation and/or closure plan is inadequate and/or fails to 
consider viable alternatives 
2 
Specific comments supporting 
more stringent infrastructure 
plans 
Support Alternative 5 (dry stack tailing) 7 
 Support Alternative 4 (Birch Tree Crossing port) 6 
 Support Alternative 3A (LNG powered trucks) 4 
 Support Alternative 3B (Diesel Pipeline) 2 
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APPENDIX 2: NATIVE VILLAGE OF NAPAIMUTE RESOLUTION 
 
 
  
P. 0. 13ox !jOT 
13ethel, AK. f'f'77f' 
Ph: (f'O.l)5+7-2B8.7(13et.) / (f'O.l)222-5058 or 222-b08+ (Nap.) 
Fx: (f'O.l) 7+7-2Bf'Z 
Email: napaimute•gci.net 
Website: www.napaimute.org 
Resolution No. 16-02 
A Resolution To Formally Request That The Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) Extend The Public 
Comment Period for the Donlin Gold Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) By An Additional 
Six (6) Months Beyond The Current Comment Deadline Of April 30th, 2016. 
WHEREAS, the Napaimute Traditional Council is the federally recognized tribal governing body for The 
Native Village ofNapaimute, and; 
WHEREAS, the Napaimute Traditional Council represents the interests of the tribal members of The Native 
Village ofNapaimute, and; 
WHEREAS, the Napaimute Traditional Council believes that given the scale and scope of the proposed Donlin 
Gold project, the sheer volume and technical nature of the issues and alternatives analyzed in theDEIS: and 
conflicting Agency conclusions on the impact to subsistence uses that additional time is required for public 
review of the document to allow for meaningful comments to the ACOE by the public on the DEIS; 
WHEREAS, Federal Agencies are required to make efforts to provide meaningful public involvement in their 
NEPA process (CEQ NEPA Regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), 1506.6(b)); 
WHEREAS, the Napaimute Traditional Council does not feel that the current public participation efforts to-
date, or scheduled prior to the April 30th deadline will meet the requirements of "providing meaningful public 
involvement", for reasons stated above; 
WHEREAS, the proposed project will directly affect our Tribal Members along with other Kuskokwim 
Stakeholders for generations to come, potentially in perpetuity; 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Napaimute Traditional Council is formally requesting that 
the ACOE extend the public comment period six (6) months beyond the current deadline of April 30th, 2016, 
and that the ACOE schedule additional outreach with the affected communities and Tribes during this extended 
period for the purpose of soliciting meaningful public comments on the DEIS; 
AND FURTHERMORE BE IT RESOLVED, that the Environmental Director for the Native Village of 
Napaimute has been in contact with the U.S. Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution to inquire as to 
what services they can provide to facilitate our request, and given the controversy surrounding the proposed 
project we would encourage your Agency to do likewise. 
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CERTIFICATION: 
This resolution was adopted at a meeting in which a quorum of the Native Village ofNapaimute 
Traditional Council was present. Passed and approved on the 17st day of February 2016 with a vote of 5 
Yes, 0 No, and 0 Abstain. 
Devron K. Hellings, PresilED.t 
